Creation Questions

Category: Philosophy

  • Human Eyes – Optimized Design

    Human Eyes – Optimized Design

    Is the human eye poorly designed? Or is it optimal?

    If you ask most proponents of modern evolutionary theory, you will often hear that the eye is a pinnacle of unfortunate evolutionary history and dysteleology.

    There are three major arguments that are used in defending this view:

    The human eye:

    1. is inverted (retina) and wired backwards
    2. has a blind spot due to nerve exit
    3. Is fragile due to retinal detachment

    #1 THE HUMAN EYE IS INVERTED

    The single most famous critique is, of course, the backward wiring of the retina. An optimal sensor should use its entire surface area for data collection, right? The vertebrate eye requires obstruction of the eye-path by axons and capillaries before it hits the photoreceptors.

    Take the cephalopod eye: it has an everted retina, the photo receptors face the light and the nerves are behind them meaning there is no need for a blind spot. The human reversed wiring represents a mere local (rather than global) maximum where the eye could only optimize so far due to its evolutionary history.

    Yet, this argument misses non-negotiable constraints. There is a metabolic necessity for the human eye which doesn’t exist in the squid or octopus.

    Photoreceptors (the rods and cones) have the highest metabolic rate of any cell in the body. They generate extreme heat and oxygen levels and undergo constant repair from constant reaction from photons. The energy demand is massive. This is an issue of thermoregulation, not just optics.

    The reason this is important is because the vertebrate eye is structured with an inverted retina precisely for the survival and longevity of these high-energy photoreceptors. These cells require massive, continuous nutrient and oxygen delivery, and rapid waste removal.

    The current inverted orientation is the only geometric configuration that allows the photoreceptors to be placed in direct contact with the Retinal Pigment Epithelium (RPE) and the choroid. The choroid, a vascular layer, serves as the cooling system and high-volume nutrient source, similar to a cooling unit directly attached to a high-performance processor.

    If the retina were wired forward, the neural cabling would form a barrier, blocking the connection between the photoreceptors and the choroid. This would inevitably lead to nutrient starvation and thermal damage. Not only that, but human photoreceptors constantly shed toxic outer segments due to damage, which must be removed via phagocytosis by the RPE. The eye needs the tips of the photoreceptors to be physically embedded in the RPE. 

    If the nerve fibers were placed in front they would form a barrier, preventing waste removal. This specific geometry is a geometric imperative for long-term molecular recycling and allows for eyes that last for 80+ years on the regular.

    Critics often insist however that even given the neural and capillary layers being necessary for metabolism, it is still a poor design because they block or scatter incoming light. 

    Yet, research has demonstrated that Müller glial cells span the thickness of the retina and act as essentially living fiber-optic cables. These cells possess a higher refractive index than the surrounding tissue, which gives them the capability to channel light directly to the cones with minimal scattering.

    So this criticism actually goes from being a poor design choice into an awesome low-pass filter which improves the signal-to-noise ratio and visual acuity of the human eye.

    But wait, there’s more! The neural layers contain yellow pigments (lutein and zeaxanthin) which absorb excess blue and ultraviolet light that is highly phototoxic! This layer is basically a forcefield against harmful rays (photo-oxidative damage) which extends the lifespan of these super delicate sensors.

    #2 THE HUMAN EYE HAS A BLIND SPOT

    However, the skeptics will still push back (which leads to point number 2): But surely a good design would not include a blind spot where the optic nerve runs through! And indeed this point is a fairly powerful one at a glance. But on further inspection, we see that this exit point, where literally millions of nerve fibers bundle together to pass the photoreceptors, is an example of optimized routing and not a critical flaw of any kind.

    This is true for many reasons. For one, by having the nerves bundle into this reinforced exit point, in this way, maximized the structural robustness of the remaining retina. Basically, if it were not this way, and the nerve fibers exited individually or even in small clusters across the retina, it would radically lower the integrity of the whole design. It would make the retina prone to tearing during rapid eye movements (saccades). In other words, we wouldn’t be getting much REM sleep! That, but also, we’d be missing out on most looking around of any kind.

    I’d say, even if that was the only advantage, the loss of a tiny fraction of our visual field is worth the trade-off.

    Second, and this is important, the blind spot is functionally irrelevant. What do I mean by that? I mean that humans were designed with two eyes for the purpose of seeing depth-of-field, i.e., understanding where things are in space. You can’t do that with one eye, so that’s not an option. With two eyes, the functional retina of the left eye covers the blind spot of the right eye, and vice versa. There is no problem in this design if both the vision is covered and depth-of-field are covered 100% accurately: which they are.

    Third, the optic disc is also used for integrated signal processing, containing melanopsin-driven cells that calibrate brightness perception for the entire eye, using the exit cable as a sensor probe. That means that the nerves also detect brightness and run the logistics in a localized region which is incredibly efficient.

    #3 THE HUMAN EYE IS VULNERABLE

    That is, the vulnerability specifically refers to retinal detachment. That is when the neural retina separates from the RPE. Why does this happen? It is a consequence of the retina being held loosely against the choroid, largely by hydrostatic pressure. Critics call this a failure point. Wouldn’t a good design be one where the RPE is solidly in place, especially if it needs to be connected to the retina? Well… no, not remotely.

    The RPE must actively transport massive amounts of fluid (approximately 10 liters per day) out of the subretinal space to the choroid to prevent edema (swelling) and maintain clear vision. A mechanically fused retina would impede this rapid fluid transport and waste exchange. Basically, the critics offer a solution which is really a non-solution. There is no possible way the eye could function at all by the means they suggest as the alternative “superior” version.

    So, what have we learned?

    The human eye is not a collection of accidents, but a masterpiece of constrained optimization. When the entire system (eye and brain) is evaluated, the result is astonishing performance. The eye achieves resolution at the diffraction limit (the theoretical physical limit imposed by the wave nature of light!) at the fovea, meaning it is hitting the maximum acuity possible for an aperture of its size.

    The arguments that the eye is “sub-optimal” often rely on comparing it to the structurally simpler cephalopod eye. Yet, cephalopod eyes lack trichromatic vision (they don’t see color like we do), have lower acuity (on the scale of hundreds of times worse clarity), and only function for a lifespan of 1–2 years (whereas the human eye must self-repair and maintain high performance for eight decades). The eye’s complexity—the Müller cells, the foveal pit, and the inverted architecture—are the necessary subsystems required to achieve this maximal performance within the constraints of vertebrate biology and physics.

    That’s not even getting to things like mitochondrial microlens in our cells which are essential for processing light. Recent research suggests that mitochondria in cone photoreceptors may actually function as micro-lenses to concentrate light, adding another layer of optical optimization. Optimization which would need to be there, perhaps a lot earlier than even the reversed lens structure.

    The fact that the eye is so optimal still remains, despite the critics best attempts at thwarting it. Therefore, the question remains, how could something so optimized evolve by random chance mutation, as well as so early and often in the history of biota?

  • Specious Extrapolations in Origin of Species

    Specious Extrapolations in Origin of Species

    In The Origin of Species, Darwin outlines evidence against the contemporary notion of species fixity, i.e., the idea that species represent immovable boundaries. He first uses the concepts of variations alongside his introduced mechanism of natural selection to create a plausible case for not merely variations, breeds, or races of organisms, but indeed species as commonly descended. Then, in chapter 4, after introducing a taxonomic tree as a picture of biota diversification, he writes, 

    “I see no reason to limit the process of modification, as now explained, to the formation of genera alone.”

    This sentence encapsulates the theoretical move that introduced the concept of universal common ancestry as a permissible and presently accepted scientific model. There is much to discuss regarding the arguments and warrants of the modern debate; however, let us take Darwin on his own terms. In those premier paragraphs of his seminal work, was Darwin’s extrapolation merited? Do the mechanisms and the evidence put forth for them bring us to this inevitable conclusion, or perhaps is the argument yet inconclusive? In this essay, we will argue that, while Darwin’s analogical reasoning was ingenious, his reliance on uniformitarianism and nominalism may render his extrapolation less secure than it first appears.

    In order to explain this, one must first understand the logical progression Darwin must follow. There are apparently three major assumptions—or premises. These are (1) analogism–artificial selection is analogous to natural selection, (2) uniformitarianism–variation is a mostly consistent and uniform process through biological time, and (3) nominalism–all variations and, therefore, all forms, vary by degree only and not kind. Here, we use ‘nominalism’ in the sense that species categories reflect human classification rather than intrinsic natural divisions, a position Darwin implicitly adopts.

    Of his three assumptions, one shows itself to be particularly strong—that of analogism. He spends most of the first four chapters defending this premise from multiple angles. He goes into detail on the powers of artificial selection in chapter one. His detail helps us identify which particular aspect of artificial selection leads to the observed robustness and fitness within its newly delineated populations. For this, he highlights mild selection over a long time. While one can see a drastic change in quick selection, this type of selection is less sustainable. It offers a narrower range of variable options (as variations take time to emerge).

    However, even with this carefully developed premise, let us not overlook its flaws. Notice that the evidence for the power of long-term selection is said to show that it brings about more robust or larger changes within some organisms in at least some environments. However, what evidence does Darwin present to demonstrate this case?

    Darwin does not provide a formal, quantifiable, long-term experiment to demonstrate the superiority of mild, long-term selection. Instead, he relies on descriptive, historical examples from breeders’ practices and then uses a logical argument based on the nature of variation. Thus, Darwin’s appeal demonstrates plausibility, not proof. This is an important distinction if one is to treat natural selection as a mechanism of universal transformation rather than limited adaptation.

    Even still, the extrapolation of differential selection and the environment’s role in that is not egregiously contentious or strange. Moreover, perhaps surprisingly, the assumption of analogism seems to be the most mutable extrapolation. The processes which stand in more doubt are Uniformitarianism and Nominalism (which will be the issue of the rest of this essay). The assumptions of uniformitarianism and nominalism undergird Darwin’s broader inference. When formalized, they resemble the following abductive arguments:

    Argument from Persistent Variation and Selection:

    Premise 1: If the mechanisms of variation and natural selection are persistent through time, then we can infer universal common descent.

    Premise 2: The mechanisms of variation and natural selection are persistent through time.

    Conclusion: Therefore, we can infer universal common descent.

    Argument from Difference in Degree:

    Premise 1: If all life differs only by degree and not kind, then we can infer that variation is a sufficient process to create all modern forms of life.

    Premise 2: All life differs only by degree and not kind,

    Conclusion: Therefore, we infer that variation is a sufficient process to create all modern forms of life.

    From these inferential conclusions, we see the importance of the two final assumptions as a fountainhead of the stream of Darwinian theory. 

    Before moving on, a few disclaimers are in order. It is worth noting that both arguments are contingent on the assumption that biology has existed throughout long geological time scales, but that is to be put aside for now. Notice we are now implicitly granting the assumption of analogism, and this imported doctrine is, likewise, essential to any common descent arguments. Finally, it is also worth clarifying that Darwin’s repeated insistence that ‘no line of demarcation can be drawn’ between varieties and species exemplifies the nominalist premise on which this argument from degree depends.

    To test these assumptions and determine whether they are as plausible as Darwin takes them to be, we first need to examine their constituent evidence and whether they provide empirical or logical support for Darwin’s thesis.

    The uniformitarian view can be presented in several ways. For Darwin, the view was the lens through which he saw biology, based on the Principles of Geology as articulated by Charles Lyell. Overall, it is not a poor inferential standard by any means. There are, however, certain caveats that limit its relevance in any science. Essentially, the mechanism in question must be precisely known, in that what X can do is never extrapolated into what X cannot do as part of its explanatory power. 

    How Darwin frames the matter is to say, “I observe X happening at small scales, therefore X can accumulate indefinitely.” This is not inherently incorrect or poor science in and of itself. However, one might ask: if one does not know the specific mechanisms involved in this variation process, is it really plausible to extrapolate these unknown variables far into the past or the future? Without knowing how variation actually works (no Mendelian genetics, no understanding of heredity’s material basis), Darwin is in a conundrum. He cannot justify the assumption that variation is unlimited if he cannot explain what it would even mean for that proposition to be true across deep time. It is like measuring the Mississippi’s sediment deposition rate, as was done for over 170 years, and extrapolating it back in time, when the river spanned the Gulf of Mexico. Alternatively, it is like measuring the processes of water erosion along the White Cliffs of Dover and extrapolating back in time until it reaches the European continent. In the first case, there is an apparent flaw in assuming constant deposition rates. In the second case, it is evident that water alone could not have caused the original break between England and France.

    It is the latter issue that is of deep concern here. There are too many unknowns in this equation to make it remotely scientific. It is not true that observing a phenomenon consistently requires understanding its mechanisms to extrapolate. However, Darwin’s theory is historical in a way that gravity, disease, or early mechanistic explanations were not. It cannot be immediately tested. Darwin, at best, leaves us to do the bulk of the grunt work after indulging in what can only be called guesswork.

    Darwin’s second line of reasoning to reach the universal common ancestry thesis relies heavily on a philosophical view of reality: nominalism. For nominalism to be correct, all traits and features would need to be quantitatively different (longer/shorter, harder/softer, heavier/lighter, rougher/smoother) without any that are qualitatively different (light/dark, solid/liquid/gas, color/sound, circle/square). In order to determine whether biology contains quality distinctions, we must understand how and in what way kinds become differentiable.

    The best polemical examples of discrete things, which differ more than just in degree, are colors. Colors could be hard to pin down on occasion. Darwin would have an easy time, as he did with species and variation taxonomical discourse, pointing out the divisive groups of thought in the classification of colors. Intuitively, there is a straightforward flow of some red to some blue. Even if they are mostly distinguishable, is not that cloud or wash of in-betweens enough to question the whole enterprise of genuine or authentic categories?

    However, moving from blue to yellow is not just an increase or decrease in something; it is a change to an entirely new color identity. It is a new form. The perceptual experience of blue is qualitatively different from the perceptual experience of yellow. Meaning they affect the viewer in particular and different ways. Hues, specifically, are indeed highly differentiated and are clear species within the genus of color. An artist mixing blue and yellow to create green does not thereby prove that blue and yellow are not real, distinct colors—only that intermediates are possible. Likewise, it is no business of the taxonomer, which calls some species and others variations, to negate the realness of any of these separate groups and count them as arbitrary and nominal. If colors—which exist on a continuous spectrum of wavelengths—still exhibit qualitative differences, then Darwin’s assumption that ALL biological features exist only on quantitative gradients becomes questionable.

    However, Darwin has done this very thing, representing different kinds of structures with different developmental origins and functional architectures as a mere spectrum with no distinct affections or purposes. Darwin needs variation to be infinitely plastic, but what does he say to real biological constraints? Is it ever hard to tell the difference between a plant and an animal? A beak from fangs? A feather from fur? A nail from a claw? A leaf from a pine needle? What if body plans have inherent organizational logic that resists certain transformations? He is treating organisms like clay that can be molded into any form, but what if they are more like architectural structures with load-bearing walls? Darwin is missing good answers to these concerns. All of which need answers in order to call the Argument from Difference in Degree sound or convincing. 

    This critique does not diminish Darwin’s achievement in proposing a naturalistic mechanism for adaptation. Instead, it highlights the philosophical assumptions embedded in his leap from observable variation to universal common descent. Assumptions that, in 1859, lacked the mechanistic grounding that would make such extrapolation scientifically secure.

  • The Five Major Challenges To Hume’s Skepticism

    The Five Major Challenges To Hume’s Skepticism

    In David Hume’s book A Treatise of Human Nature, he constructs what he calls the science of man. One cannot rightly understand any other species of science before this foundational science. The most radical and paradigm-shifting realization, for Hume, is that if all that exists are impressions and ideas, there are no grounds to truly justify putting any two impressions together causally, no matter how we might be inclined or disposed to do so, either by vulgar habit or through any rational means. This profound insight — that impressions are singular moments of a particular feeling with no relation except that of imagination — forced philosophers (including critics such as Reid) to deeply re-evaluate theories of knowledge acquisition and general epistemic concerns.

    Reid says this in his dedication for An Inquiry into the Human Mind, “His reasoning appeared to me to be just: there was therefore a necessity to call in question the principles upon which it was founded, or to admit the conclusions.” However, there are more reasons than the mere founding principles to reject Hume’s rationale. Drawing on a recent and rigorous debate, here are the five major critiques that make me skeptical of Hume’s skeptical conclusions.

    1. Circular Reasoning (The Problem of Induction)

    Hume uses causal reasoning (observing past regularities and inferring principles about human nature) to undermine the rational basis of causal reasoning. Suppose Hume justifies the separation of cause and correlation from experience, and he uses the distinction to describe and also argue against cause-and-effect as existing outside the mind (outside a relation/idea). In that case, he is making a circular argument. The implications of this circular reasoning are profound, as it challenges the very basis of our understanding of cause and effect. If belief in necessary connection is understood apart from reason, then there is equally no reason to undermine causal reasoning. The basis for an essential connection is reason and logical deduction. Thus, we can infer it from particular impressions, or it is not, and thus we can infer it based on specific impressions. Nothing falls on his skeptical rebuttal. You cannot easily conceive of a cause without an effect, any more than a premise without a conclusion.

    2. The Self-Refutation of Assertion and Communication

    The fact that Hume is making an argument refutes his point entirely. On what grounds can Hume either 1. make a distinction between kinds of necessity or 2. place either relations or matters of fact squarely into one category? Unthinkable things are equivalent to non-existent things, according to Hume. Therefore, you cannot make claims about external reality with reference to non-existent concepts. Even concepts of the imagination must exist by virtue of real impressions that have newly associated connections. Where are the impressions for a law such as non-contradiction?

    Hume believes we cannot know a table exists, so this is not simply descriptive. His outward attempts to convince others, and the fact that he has followers who support his theory, testify against him. Psychological interpretations of reality are false simply because meaning exists apart from the mechanical goings-on of the mind, and that meaning is communicable. The very fact that Hume is articulating his theory indicates such. Even a phenomenological view is better than psychologism.

    3. The Ad Hoc Assumption of External Existence

    Hume asks for the impression that gives rise to the idea of continuation and external existence separate from our perception, but where does he get the idea of continuation and external existence in the first place? If everything is sense impressions, how is he arguing against anything contrary to sense impressions? This is all very ad hoc. Calling concepts fabrications of the imagination and such. Does he not realize that by doing so, he’s condemning his very principles, which allowed him to condemn continuation and external existence?

    4. The Active Nature of Impressions, Not Raw Data

    There is also another popular critique of Hume. That is the notion of the tree falling in the woods. The tree falls without making a sound. A sound is something that can only be heard. The point being, Hume’s impressions already imply cause-and-effect before they are even interpreted or registered. Here is another thing. If two people hear a recording of an orchestra, but one of them has finely tuned ears for orchestration while the other does not, then, on first glance, the one with finely tuned ears will hear the counter-melody played on the violin. The one that does not is not surprising. However, Hume would have to acknowledge this as an impression reflected, interpreted by relation (all of which in a near-instant), yet that implies a higher acuity has been granted to the one in the realm of a particular sense. If sense is raw data, and therefore something that you receive and not create, it stands to reason that you should not be able to improve in the tacit reception of raw data. This analogy highlights the inherent contradictions in Hume’s argument, suggesting that our senses are not passive receptors of information but active interpreters that can improve over time.

    5. The Flawed Equivalence of Conceivability and Possibility

    A rigorous philosophical objection to Hume’s conclusion on necessity centers on his premise that what is conceivable is logically possible. Hume argues that because we can conceive of a cause without its usual effect (e.g., imagining the sun not rising) without contradiction, the necessary connection is not a truth of reason, but of habit. However, this conflates a psychological possibility (what we can imagine) with a metaphysical possibility (what could actually happen in reality). Contemporary critics argue that our inability to conceive of a contradiction in a causal break may reflect our epistemic limitations —our ignorance of deep, non-obvious natural laws —rather than a statement about the world itself. Therefore, the supposed “freedom” of the imagination that underpins his skepticism is merely a function of our ignorance of actual natural necessity, and his argument fails to prove that the necessity is truly absent from the objects themselves.

  • J. Budziszewski’s Natural Theology of Sex: A Pathway to Biblical Understanding

    J. Budziszewski’s Natural Theology of Sex: A Pathway to Biblical Understanding

    J. Budziszewski, in his insightful work On the Meaning of Sex, presents a compelling natural theological framework that grounds sexual ethics in the inherent design and purpose of human beings. This approach, by meticulously analyzing the given structure of human nature, offers a robust pathway that can successfully lead to a Biblical understanding of sexuality and gender. Budziszewski argues that meaning is not arbitrarily assigned but is discovered through the inherent design of creation, and it is this foundational concept that shapes his comprehensive view of sexual morality.

    A) The Foundational Idea: Inherent Design and Purpose

    The bedrock of Budziszewski’s philosophy, especially concerning the questions of sexuality and gender, is the conviction that meaning is intrinsic to reality, particularly to human nature itself. He firmly asserts, “Meaning isn’t arbitrary. Yes, we can associate sex in our minds with anything we choose—with pain, pleasure, tedium, amusement, alienation, reconciliation, fertility, sterility, misery, joy, life, death, or what have you. This is true of all things, not just sex. We can associate anything with anything” (7). However, he immediately clarifies that subjective association does not alter objective meaning. For Budziszewski, human nature is not an external master but “the deep structure of what we really are” (8). True freedom, then, is not the ability to transcend this nature, but rather the ability to align our wills with it, to allow “the meanings and purposes that lie fallow in sexuality [to] unfold” (8). He explains that the human will is not separate from nature but an integral part of it, asserting that the will’s nobility lies in its capacity to discern and direct itself according to the inherent wisdom embedded in our being.

    Budziszewski confronts common objections to this idea, particularly the notion that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” He dismantles this dogma by using simple, yet powerful, examples. When discussing the lungs, he posits, “When we say that their purpose is to oxygenate the blood, are we just making that up? Of course not. The purpose of oxygenation isn’t in the eye of the beholder; it’s in the design of the lungs themselves” (22). This emphasis on “the design of the lungs” is crucial; it implies that purpose is empirically discoverable. Furthermore, he contends that to violate this inherent design, such as by “sniffing glue,” does not change the lung’s purpose but only “violates it” (22). Similarly, regarding eyes, he argues, “If the purpose of eyes is to see, then eyes that see well are good eyes, and eyes that see poorly are poor ones. Given their purpose, this is what it means for eyes to be good. Moreover, good is to be pursued; the appropriateness of pursuing it is what it means for anything to be good. Therefore, the appropriate thing to do with poor eyes is try to turn them into good ones” (22). This demonstrates that understanding a thing’s inherent purpose necessarily implies an “ought”—an imperative to act in accordance with that purpose. He further distinguishes “purpose” from mere “function,” stating that purpose signifies something “ordered or directed to an end,” whereas function merely “signifies the mode in which purpose is present in things rather than in minds” (23). This foundational idea underpins his entire argument: that human beings, as integrated wholes of “mind and flesh united,” must respect the inherent design of their bodies, including their sexuality (23). While he acknowledges that some might dismiss his work as “religious” due to references to “God,” he insists that divine grace, if real, is “inescapably relevant to human life” and can be understood even through natural reasoning (11).

    B) Application to Gender and Sexuality

    Applying this foundational idea, Budziszewski posits that human sexuality possesses “embedded principles and the inbuilt meaning of the human sexual design” (21). He laments that “errors about sex cause such terrible suffering, in our day more than most” (12), and attributes this suffering to the flouting of these inherent meanings. He identifies two fundamental “natural meanings” of sex that are “so tightly stitched that we can start with either one and follow the threads to the other” (24): procreation and union.

    First, regarding procreation, Budziszewski asserts that it is the “bring about and nurture of new life, the formation of families in which children have moms and dads” (24). He outlines two conditions for establishing something’s purpose: it must actually bring about the effect, and the causal connection must explain its existence. Sexuality undeniably meets both: “the sexual powers do bring about procreation,” and “apart from the link between the sexual powers and new life, any explanation of why we have sexual powers at all would be woefully incomplete” (25). This procreative meaning, in turn, necessitates the concept of union. He argues, “For us, procreation requires an enduring partnership between two beings, the man and the woman, who are different, but in ways that enable them to complete and balance each other. Union, then, characterizes the distinctly human mode of procreation” (25). This enduring partnership between a man and a woman is essential not only for conception but also for the raising of children, as “the male is better suited to protection, the female to nurture” (26). Children also need models of both sexes and the relationship between them to thrive and eventually form their own families. He even cites sociologists Sara S. McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, who suggest that “If we were asked to design a system for making sure that children’s basic needs were met, we would probably come up with something quite similar to the two-parent ideal” (26).

    Conversely, Budziszewski demonstrates how starting with the unitive meaning also leads back to procreation. He states, “We join ourselves by doing what? By an act which is intrinsically open to the possibility of new life. In other words, whenever I give myself sexually, I am doing something that cannot help but mean that happy chance” (27). This implies that a true, total self-giving in union de facto means a bodily giving, which inherently carries the possibility of new life. He powerfully illustrates this with the concept of the body’s objective “speech”: “What you intend subjectively can’t change what your act means objectively…When the speech of the mouth contradicts the speech of the body, the body’s speech repeals the mouth’s. To crush your windpipe with my thumbs is to say to you, ‘Now die,’ even if I tell you with my mouth, ‘Be alive’” (27). Sexual union, therefore, objectively “speaks” of total, self-giving, life-affirming communion, regardless of subjective intent. By the end of this analysis, Budziszewski concludes that these are “the natural laws of sex” (33).

    C) Evaluation and Connection to Biblical Understanding

    Budziszewski’s position is remarkably helpful and coherent in discussing gender and sexuality, particularly as it provides a clear pathway to understanding these concepts from a Biblical perspective. His natural law approach, by grounding sexual ethics in discernible human design and purpose, offers a rational basis for moral norms that is not solely reliant on religious dogma, even as it ultimately aligns with it. He addresses the widespread confusion of our age, where “everything is topsy-turvy and confused,” by reminding us that “It is harder to write about what is obvious but unrecognized than about what is really obscure” (15). His method makes the “obvious” — the inherent meaning of sex — recognizable again.

    The direct alignment between Budziszewski’s “natural laws of sex” and Biblical principles is striking. The procreative meaning he identifies, “the bring about and nurture of new life, the formation of families in which children have moms and dads,” finds a direct echo in the Genesis mandate, “Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28). This divine command is not an arbitrary rule but an affirmation of the inherent design for flourishing that God embedded within creation, particularly in human sexual powers. The natural purpose of bringing forth new life and fostering it within the structure of a family led by a mother and a father is, for Budziszewski, a self-evident truth discoverable through observation, much like the purpose of lungs or eyes.

    Similarly, his unitive meaning of sex—the “mutual and total self-giving and accepting of two polar, complementary selves in their entirety, soul and body”—is perfectly mirrored in the Biblical concept of “one flesh” (Genesis 2:24; Matthew 19:5-6). This Biblical phrase signifies not merely physical intimacy but a profound, holistic union of two distinct yet complementary individuals (male and female) into a new relational entity. Budziszewski’s argument that sexual union is “intrinsically open to the possibility of new life” and that subjective intent cannot override the objective “speech” of the body powerfully reinforces the sanctity and seriousness of the one-flesh union as depicted in scripture. The Bible’s understanding of marriage as the exclusive context for sexual intimacy, and the procreative blessing associated with it, finds a rational foundation in Budziszewski’s natural law deductions. His framework thus serves as a potent apologetic, demonstrating that the Biblical understanding of sexuality is not a set of arbitrary prohibitions but rather a reflection of the deepest truths embedded in human nature by its Creator.

    In conclusion, J. Budziszewski’s approach to natural theology in On the Meaning of Sex provides an exceptionally valuable framework for understanding sexuality and gender. By firmly grounding his arguments in the inherent design and purpose of human nature, he navigates complex ethical terrain with clarity and precision. His articulation of sex’s natural meanings—procreation and union—is not only philosophically robust but also demonstrably converges with the ethical insights found in Biblical teachings. In a world often characterized by confusion and suffering regarding sexual identity and behavior, Budziszewski’s work offers a compelling and coherent pathway to rediscovering meaning, leading ultimately to a fuller appreciation of sexuality and gender as they are divinely designed and revealed.

    Works Cited

    Budziszewski, J. On the Meaning of Sex. InterVarsity Press, 2012.The New American Standard Bible, 1995.

  • The Pagan Can Be Saved?

    The Pagan Can Be Saved?

    Wesley Coleman

    In Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus breaks down notions, based on objective and speculative interpretations, of Christianity, arguing instead that authentic religious truth is fundamentally subjective. As exemplified in his assertion on page 201 regarding truth in prayer, Climacus posits that the manner of an individual’s infinite, passionate relation to the eternal—even in the face of objective uncertainty or perceived untruth—is paramount, superseding intellectual assent to dogma or historical fact and revealing the inherent limitations of any detached, disinterested approach to faith. This stance foregrounds the lived reality of faith as a personal, strenuous endeavor, fundamentally separate from and perhaps at odds with objective inquiry.

    Kierkegaard, through Climacus, opens the Postscript by challenging what he identifies as problematic approaches to understanding Christianity: the historical, the speculative, and the superficial religiousness prevalent in his time. From the very start, Kierkegaard has separated the objective issue of the truth of Christianity from the subjective issue of the subjective individual’s relation to the truth of Christianity (Kierkegaard 22). Climacus contends that the objective point of view, whether focusing on historical or philosophical truth, is inherently flawed when applied to Christianity. An objective inquiry is characterized as “disinterested,” seeking to establish truth through critical consideration of reports or the relation of doctrine to eternal truth. However, for an individual concerned with their eternal happiness, historical certainty, being merely an “approximation,” is profoundly insufficient. This is because “an approximation is too little to build his happiness on and is so unlike an eternal happiness that no result can ensue” (Kierkegaard 22). The scholarly pursuit, while commendable in its erudition, ultimately “distracts” from the issue of an individual’s faith (Kierkegaard 14) and “suppresses” the vital dialectical clarity required for true understanding (Kierkegaard 11).

    The fundamental problem with objectivity, as Climacus elaborates, is its inherent detachment from the individual’s existence. The “objective subject” is too “modest” and “immodest” to include himself in the inquiry; he is interested but “not infinitely, personally, impassionedly interested in his relation to this truth concerning his own eternal happiness” (Kierkegaard 22). This detachment leads to a comical self-deception: “Precisely this is the basis of the scholar’s elevated calm and the parroter’s comical thoughtlessness” (Kierkegaard 22). Christianity, Climacus asserts, is spirit; spirit is inwardness; inwardness is subjectivity; subjectivity is essentially passion, and at its maximum an infinite, personally interested passion for one’s eternal happiness. Therefore, as soon as subjectivity is taken away, and passion from subjectivity, and infinite interest from passion, there is no decision whatsoever. The objective approach, by sacrificing this infinite, personal, impassioned interestedness, paradoxically makes one too objective to have eternal happiness. The speculative point of view fares no better, attempting to permeate Christianity with thought and and make it eternal thought. Yet, if Christianity is truly subjectivity, a matter of inward deepening, then objective indifference cannot come to know anything whatsoever. Like is understood only by like; thus, the knower must be in the requisite state of infinite, passionate interest. Speculative thought, in its objectivity, is “totally indifferent to his and my and your eternal happiness” (Kierkegaard 55), making its “happiness” an illusion as it attempts to be “exclusively eternal within time” (Kierkegaard 56).

    This critique of objective and speculative approaches, which Climacus gradually unfolds finally builds to a climax on page 201 with the passage at hand to be dealt with. The chapter titled “Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth Is Subjectivity” in Part Two directly introduces the core concept that “truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to immerse oneself, existing, in subjectivity” (Kierkegaard 192). Climacus establishes that for an existing person, “the question about truth persists” not as an abstract definition, but as something to “exist in” (Kierkegaard 191). He dismisses mediation and the abstract “subject-object” as reverting to abstraction (Kierkegaard 192), emphasizing that “an existing person cannot be in two places at the same time, cannot be subject-object” (Kierkegaard 199). The “I-I” is explicitly called a “mathematical point that does not exist at all” (Kierkegaard 197), making it clear, for Climacus, that it is an impossibility for an existing human being to transcend their individual, passionate existence and achieve this abstract oneness. For Climacus, “only ethical and ethical-religious knowing is essential knowing” (Kierkegaard 198), and such knowing is always essentially related to the knower’s own existence.

    The critical distinction, immediately preceding the paragraph in question, is articulated as: “When the question about truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected upon objectively as an object to which the knower relates himself…When the question about truth is asked subjectively, the individual’s relation is reflected upon subjectively. If only the how of this relation is in truth, the individual is in truth, even if he in this way were to relate himself to untruth” (Kierkegaard 199). This prioritizes the mode of relation over the object of relation in its abstracted form separate from engagement.

    Then, the force of Climacus’s argument is finally catalyzed. He starts with an aggressive remark, “now, if the problem is to calculate where there is more truth…then there can be no doubt about the answer for anyone who is not totally botched by scholarship and science” (Kierkegaard 201). The harsh remark is true, it is intuitive for all those not steeped in abstraction. Those who are incapable of grasping the truth are those which have been immersed in a harmful way of thinking, and Climacus’s words are meant to provoke that truth. The phrase “botched by scholarship and science” in particular is reminiscent of the “infinite, personal, impassioned interestedness” which exists in the person practicing the objective issue (Kierkegaard 27).

    Climacus then explicitly rules out any notion of a neutral, balanced approach: “(and, as stated, simultaneously to be on both sides equally is not granted to an existing person but is only a beatifying delusion for a deluded I-I)” (Kierkegaard 201). This re-emphasizes that an existing human being cannot inhabit the abstract “subject-object” or “I-I,” which is a phantom of pure thought (Kierkegaard 192). To attempt such a mediation between objective and subjective approaches is a “delusion,” a fantastical escape from the concrete reality of existing. An existing person is always in a process of becoming (Kierkegaard 192), and this inherent motion precludes the static, all-encompassing view of the “I-I” (Kierkegaard 199).

    The core of the paragraph is the deep dichotomy presented: “whether on the side of the person who only objectively seeks the true God and the approximating truth of the God-idea or on the side of the person who is infinitely concerned that he in truth relate himself to God with the infinite passion of need” (Kierkegaard 201). The dichotomy is on one hand, “the true God” and “approximating truth of the God-idea” and on the other, “infinite passion of need.” The objective seeker remains stuck in approximate knowledge, which, as established earlier, is insufficient for eternal happiness. In contrast, the “infinite passion of need” signifies the highest subjectivity, where the individual’s “eternal happiness” is at stake. This passion brings true existential importance to the individual which is impossible through speculation.

    The paragraph then presents a provocative thought experiment: “If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of the true idea of God, the house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but prays in untruth, and if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the passion of infinity, although his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol—where, then, is there more truth?” (Kierkegaard 201). This scenario is incredibly hard for many who view Christianity as something true that one believes about God. This analogy turns that presumption on its head drawing a distinction between the “what” and the “how” of faith (Kierkegaard 199). The person who is a Christian by birth or culture or even intellectually “knows the true idea of God” and prays in the “house of the true God” (Kierkegaard 201) represents the objective approach that assumes faith is an afterthought and something that can be taken for granted. Such an individual may possess all the outward forms and correct doctrines, but their prayer is “in untruth” if it lacks the “infinite passion of inwardness” (Kierkegaard 201). This coincides with Climacus’s earlier assertion that objective Christianity is pagan (Kierkegaard 43), and to know a creed by rote is paganism, because Christianity is inwardness. Their knowledge, being disinterested, is merely a vanishing, unrecognizable atom of objective understanding, not transformative truth.

    Conversely, the individual in an “idolatrous land” who prays “with all the passion of infinity” to an idol, despite the objective untruth of the object, possesses “more truth” (Kierkegaard 201). The passion itself, the subjective “how” of their relation, is the determining factor. This is because the passion of the infinite is the very truth. Their worship, even of an objectively false god, carries the weight of authentic, boundless engagement.

    The conclusion of the paragraph drives the point home: “The one prays in truth to God although he is worshiping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in truth worshiping an idol” (Kierkegaard 201). This is not a relativistic dismissal of God’s objective existence, but a radical redefinition of what constitutes truth in the context of an individual’s religious life. The person who prays passionately to an idol is, in their inwardness, genuinely seeking the divine, and this “infinite passion of need” (Kierkegaard 201) creates a true “God-relation” (Kierkegaard 199). Their relation, despite the objective error, is in truth. This is, perhaps, a shocking revelation to the one who calls the heretic ‘unsaved’. Conversely, the person who prays to the true God without this infinite passion effectively turns the true God into an “idol”—an object of detached, intellectual assent rather than a living, transforming presence. This intellectual understanding without passionate inwardness is merely an illusion. It reduces the divine to an object for intellectual scrutiny, precisely what objective thought does to Christianity (Kierkegaard 52).

    Other possible interpretations of this passage, primarily objective or speculative, fail to grasp its radical thrust. An objective interpretation would likely focus on the factual untruth of idol worship, concluding that the idolater is in untruth regardless of their passion. This perspective, however, completely misses Climacus’s central argument that objective knowledge is “indifferent” to the knower’s existence and thus cannot engage with the truth of the infinite (Kierkegaard 193). For an objective approach, the truth is merely “an object to which the knower relates himself” (Kierkegaard 199), failing to recognize that “the individual’s relation is reflected upon subjectively” and the “how” is truth (Kierkegaard 199). This kind of detached, “disinterested” knowledge simply “distracts” from the issue of faith (Kierkegaard 28).

    A speculative interpretation might attempt to mediate between the two positions, arguing that the true understanding lies in a higher synthesis where both the object and the subjective relation are reconciled. However, Climacus explicitly rejects such mediation for an existing person, stating that to be in mediation is to be finished; to exist is to become. Speculative thought, in its quest for a “system” (Kierkegaard 14), “promises everything and keeps nothing at all” for the existing individual. It assumes a “presuppositionless” beginning and ultimately “dissolves into a make-believe” of understanding faith (Kierkegaard 14). By attempting to “explain and annul” the paradox, speculative thought implicitly “corrects” Christianity instead of explaining it. The absolute paradox, which is the eternal truth coming into existence in time, cannot be understood but only believed “against the understanding” (Kierkegaard 217). Any attempt to rationally encompass or explain it is “volatilization” and a return to paganism (Kierkegaard 217). The speculative thinker, in trying to become “objective” and “disappear from himself” (Kierkegaard 56), cannot grasp the existential truth of faith, which is grounded in passion and the “utmost exertion” of the existing self (Kierkegaard 55).

    Furthermore, the interpretation that reduces Christianity to a set of doctrines or a historical phenomenon, implicitly adopted by the “Christian in the midst of Christianity” who prays “in untruth” (Kierkegaard 201), is also rejected. Christianity is not a doctrine but a relational act. The relation to a doctrine is merely intellectual, whereas the relation to Christianity is one of faith, an infinite interestedness. To be a Christian by name only is a serious danger due to the fact that it removes the necessary “infinite passion” (Kierkegaard 16). Such individuals, by “praying in untruth” (Kierkegaard 201), effectively transform the true God into an “idol” (Kierkegaard 201), stripped of the demanding, transformative power that calls for infinite inwardness.

    In conclusion, the paragraph on page 201 profoundly encapsulates Climacus’s core thesis: Christianity’s truth is existentially actualized not through objective knowledge or speculative comprehension, but through the subjective individual’s absolute, infinite passion. This passion, born of an “infinite need” and held fast against “objective uncertainty” (Kierkegaard 203), is the very essence of faith, a “contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and the objective uncertainty” (Kierkegaard 204). The example of the passionate idolater versus the dispassionate Christian reveals that the intensity and truthfulness of the subjective relation far outweighs the objective accuracy of the object of worship when it comes to genuine religiousness. This radical emphasis on the “how” of faith over the “what” forces the reader to confront the demanding, terrifying, and deeply personal nature of becoming and being a Christian, a path that rejects the easy and fragmentary reassurances of objective certainty and speculative systems in favor of a lived, passionate existence with a holistic commitment. The radical conclusion that one can have objective error and be in real relationship with God. The radical conclusion that the pagan can be saved. Not because their idol is the true God, but because they have true faith.

    Climacus, Johannes. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton UP, 1992.

  • The Incoherence of Naturalism

    The Incoherence of Naturalism

    Introduction

    Naturalism—the philosophical position that reality consists entirely of natural entities governed by natural laws—presents itself as the most rational and empirically grounded worldview. Yet despite its scientific veneer, naturalism suffers from foundational incoherence that undermines its viability as a comprehensive philosophy.

    This critique demonstrates that naturalism is self-defeating, arbitrarily restrictive, explanatorily inadequate, and internally inconsistent. Each of these failings stems not from temporary limitations in scientific knowledge but from structural contradictions within naturalism itself. Together, they render naturalism philosophically untenable and point toward the necessity of a more pluralistic metaphysical framework.

    Premise 1: Self-Defeating Foundations

    Naturalism’s first fatal flaw lies in its inability to justify its own foundations without circularity or special pleading.

    Scientific inquiry rests on several non-empirical assumptions that cannot be empirically verified: the reliability of human reason, the uniformity of nature, the correspondence between our perceptions and external reality, and principles like logical consistency and parsimony. These assumptions cannot be proven through scientific methods—they are preconditions for scientific inquiry itself.

    This creates an insurmountable problem for naturalism. If reality consists entirely of natural entities governed by natural laws, then human cognition is merely the product of evolutionary processes that selected for survival value, not truth-tracking capacity. As philosopher Alvin Plantinga argues, if our cognitive faculties evolved primarily for reproductive fitness rather than truth detection, we have no reason to trust them for accurately grasping metaphysical truths like naturalism itself.

    The naturalist might counter that evolutionary adaptiveness correlates with truth-tracking, particularly regarding immediate environmental threats. But this defense fails to bridge the gap between adaptive perceptual reliability and justified abstract metaphysical beliefs. There is no evolutionary advantage to having accurate beliefs about quantum mechanics, consciousness, or cosmic origins. Natural selection has no mechanism to select for metaphysical accuracy.

    This creates what philosopher Thomas Nagel calls an “intolerable conflict” in naturalism—it relies on rational faculties that, by its own account, evolved for survival rather than metaphysical accuracy. The naturalist faces what Barry Stroud terms “irrecoverable circularity”: they must presuppose the reliability of faculties whose reliability they then try to explain through evolutionary processes.

    Even sophisticated attempts to escape this circularity through epistemic externalism merely shift the problem. Reliabilism claims beliefs formed through reliable processes are justified regardless of whether we can prove their reliability. But this begs the question: how do we establish which processes are reliable without presupposing their reliability? At some point, non-empirical axioms must be accepted on non-natural grounds.

    If naturalists retreat to pragmatism, accepting these axioms as “useful fictions” rather than truths, they have conceded that naturalism cannot justify its foundations within its own framework. This pragmatism is itself a non-empirical philosophical commitment that naturalism can neither justify nor dispense with.

    Premise 2: Arbitrary Restriction of Inquiry

    Naturalism’s second critical flaw lies in its arbitrary restriction of legitimate inquiry to natural causes alone.

    Philosophical naturalism makes an unwarranted leap from methodological naturalism (the practical scientific approach of seeking natural causes) to a metaphysical claim that only natural causes exist. This represents a category error—moving from a useful methodological heuristic to an ontological assertion without sufficient justification.

    By defining reality exclusively in terms of what natural science can study, naturalism creates a self-fulfilling prophecy: it finds only natural causes because it defines all discoverable causes as natural by definition. This circular approach prejudices investigation rather than allowing evidence to determine the boundaries of reality.

    The most powerful demonstration of this limitation is consciousness. Despite tremendous advances in neuroscience, the qualitative character of subjective experience—what philosopher Thomas Nagel calls the “what it is like” aspect of consciousness—resists reduction to physical processes. Neuroscience can correlate neural activity with reported experiences but cannot explain why these physical processes are accompanied by subjective experience at all.

    This limitation isn’t temporary but structural—scientific methods are designed to study third-person observable phenomena, not first-person subjectivity. The scientific method, by its very nature, abstracts away subjective qualities to focus on quantifiable properties. This creates what philosopher David Chalmers calls the “hard problem” of consciousness—explaining how and why physical processes give rise to subjective experience.

    Naturalists often respond by incorporating consciousness as a “fundamental” feature of an expanded natural framework—what Chalmers calls “naturalistic dualism.” But this semantic maneuver doesn’t resolve the ontological problem. If consciousness is fundamental and irreducible to physical processes, then reality includes non-physical properties—precisely what traditional naturalism denies. This exhibits what philosopher William Hasker calls “naturalism of the gaps”—expanding the definition of “natural” to encompass whatever resists reduction.

    Unlike historical examples like electromagnetism or vitalism, which were unexplained physical phenomena eventually incorporated into expanded physical frameworks, consciousness presents a categorically different challenge—explaining how subjective experience arises from objective processes. This isn’t merely an unexplained mechanism but a conceptual chasm between fundamentally different categories of reality.

    Premise 3: Explanatory Gaps

    Naturalism’s third major flaw lies in its persistent failure to explain fundamental aspects of human experience, despite centuries of scientific progress.

    Beyond consciousness, naturalism struggles to account for several phenomena central to human existence:

    Intentionality: The “aboutness” of mental states—the fact that thoughts, beliefs, and desires are about something beyond themselves—resists physical reduction. Physical states aren’t intrinsically “about” anything; they simply are. Yet our mental states exhibit this irreducible directedness toward objects, concepts, and possibilities. Philosopher Franz Brentano identified intentionality as the defining characteristic of mental phenomena, creating an explanatory gap that naturalism has failed to bridge.

    Rationality: Logical relationships between propositions aren’t physical connections but normative ones—they describe how we ought to reason, not merely how matter behaves. The laws of logic and mathematics exhibit a necessity that natural laws lack. Natural laws describe contingent regularities that could theoretically be otherwise; logical laws express necessary truths that couldn’t possibly be different. This modal difference creates another category distinction that naturalism struggles to accommodate.

    Morality: Moral imperatives involve inherent “ought” claims that cannot be derived from purely descriptive “is” statements. As philosopher G.E. Moore identified, any attempt to define moral properties in natural terms commits the “naturalistic fallacy.” Evolutionary accounts may explain the origins of moral psychology but cannot justify moral claims as true or authoritative. If moral judgments are merely evolutionary adaptations, their normative force is undermined, creating what philosopher Sharon Street calls the “Darwinian Dilemma.”

    Naturalists often respond to these gaps through eliminativism or emergentism. Eliminativism denies the reality of these phenomena, claiming they are illusions or folk-psychological confusions. But this approach is self-defeating—an illusion of consciousness must be experienced by someone, making consciousness inescapable. As philosopher John Searle notes, “Where consciousness is concerned, the appearance is the reality.”

    Emergentism fares no better. To claim consciousness “emerges” from physical processes without explaining the mechanism of emergence merely restates the mystery. Unlike other emergent properties (like liquidity emerging from H₂O molecules), consciousness involves a transition from objective processes to subjective experience—a categorical leap, not a continuous spectrum. The naturalist must explain how arrangement of non-conscious particles yields consciousness, a challenge philosopher Colin McGinn calls “cognitive closure.”

    These explanatory gaps aren’t temporary limitations in scientific knowledge but principled barriers arising from naturalism’s restricted ontology. After centuries of scientific progress, these gaps remain as profound as ever, suggesting a fundamental inadequacy in naturalism’s conceptual resources.

    Premise 4: Inconsistent Verification

    Naturalism’s fourth fatal flaw lies in its criterion for knowledge, which cannot justify itself without inconsistency.

    The naturalist privileges empirical verification—the idea that meaningful claims must be empirically testable. Yet this verification principle itself cannot be empirically verified. It is a philosophical position, not a scientific discovery. This creates an internal contradiction: if we accept only what can be demonstrated through scientific methods, we must reject the very principle that demands such verification.

    Even if naturalists reject strict verificationism, they still privilege empirical evidence above all else. Yet this privileging itself cannot be empirically justified. It’s a meta-empirical value judgment about what counts as legitimate evidence—precisely the kind of non-empirical philosophical commitment that naturalism struggles to account for.

    Attempts to resolve this inconsistency through naturalized epistemology (following Quine) don’t solve the problem—they institutionalize it. Treating epistemology as a branch of psychology assumes the reliability of the psychological methods used to study epistemology. This creates what philosopher Laurence BonJour calls “meta-justification”—how do we justify our justificatory framework? Naturalized epistemology ultimately relies on pragmatic success, but this pragmatism itself requires non-empirical criteria for what constitutes “success.”

    Even if we accept Quine’s web of belief, some strands in the web must be anchored independently of empirical verification. These include logical principles, mathematical truths, and the assumption that reality is comprehensible. These principles aren’t empirically derived but are preconditions for empirical inquiry. Their necessity reveals naturalism’s dependence on non-natural foundations.

    Naturalism thus faces an inescapable dilemma: either it consistently applies its verification standards and undermines its own foundations, or it makes special exceptions for its core principles and thereby acknowledges limits to its explanatory scope.

    The Inescapable Dilemma of Naturalism

    These four premises reveal that naturalism faces an inescapable dilemma:

    1. Strict naturalism maintains a coherent ontology (only physical entities exist) but fails to account for consciousness, intentionality, rationality, and its own foundations.
    2. Expanded naturalism accommodates these phenomena but sacrifices coherence by stretching “natural” to include fundamentally non-physical properties.

    This isn’t merely a limitation of current knowledge but a structural impossibility within naturalism’s framework. The problem isn’t that naturalism hasn’t yet explained consciousness; it’s that consciousness is categorically different from physical processes, requiring explanatory principles that transcend physical causation.

    A “richer naturalism” that embraces consciousness as fundamental, accepts non-empirical axioms pragmatically, and incorporates abstract objects has abandoned naturalism’s core thesis that reality consists entirely of natural entities subject to natural laws. This isn’t evolution of inquiry but conceptual surrender.

    Beyond Naturalism: The Case for Metaphysical Pluralism

    The most coherent alternative to naturalism is metaphysical pluralism—recognizing that reality includes physical processes, conscious experience, abstract entities, and normative truths, without reducing any to the others.

    This pluralistic approach acknowledges that different domains of reality require appropriate methods of investigation:

    1. Physical phenomena are best studied through empirical scientific methods
    2. Conscious experience requires phenomenological approaches that honor subjectivity
    3. Logical and mathematical truths demand rational analysis independent of empirical verification
    4. Normative questions involve philosophical reflection on values, not merely empirical facts

    Unlike naturalism, pluralism doesn’t face self-defeat (it can ground rational faculties non-circularly), doesn’t arbitrarily restrict inquiry (it allows appropriate methods for different domains), and doesn’t face explanatory gaps (it acknowledges irreducible categories without eliminating them).

    Naturalists often appeal to Ockham’s Razor (parsimony) and the practical success of science (pragmatism) as reasons to prefer naturalism over more metaphysically rich views like pluralism. However, as your text implicitly and explicitly argues, these critiques are problematic when leveled by the naturalist themselves, given the internal difficulties naturalism faces.

    1. Problems with the Parsimony Critique:

    • False Parsimony: Naturalism’s claim to parsimony often amounts to ontological stinginess achieved by explanatory inadequacy. It claims to be simpler by positing only one fundamental kind of “stuff” (natural/physical). However, as your text details, this simplicity is bought at the cost of being unable to adequately account for or integrate crucial aspects of reality like consciousness, intentionality, rationality, and normativity (Premises 2 & 3). A theory that is simple but leaves vast swathes of reality unexplained is not genuinely more parsimonious than a theory that posits more fundamental categories but can actually explain or accommodate all the relevant phenomena. True parsimony should be measured not just by the number of types of entities posited, but by the overall complexity of the explanatory framework required to account for the data. Pluralism, by assigning different phenomena to different appropriate categories, might require a more diverse ontology but arguably a less strained and more comprehensive explanatory structure than naturalism, which must resort to eliminativism, mysterious emergence, or redefining terms to handle outliers.
    • Redefining “Natural” Undermines Parsimony: Your text notes that naturalists trying to accommodate phenomena like consciousness might resort to calling it a “fundamental feature” within an “expanded naturalism” or “naturalistic dualism.” This is an attempt to absorb irreducible phenomena by broadening the definition of “natural.” But this move itself adds fundamental categories or properties to the naturalist ontology. If “natural” now includes irreducible subjective experience or fundamental abstract objects, the initial claim to radical simplicity (“only physical stuff”) is surrendered. This “naturalism of the gaps” (as your text puts it) demonstrates that naturalists, when pressed, do feel the need to add fundamental categories, thereby undermining their own parsimony argument against pluralism.
    • Parsimony Itself is a Non-Empirical Principle: Ockham’s Razor is a meta-scientific or philosophical principle guiding theory choice. It’s not something discovered through empirical science. As your text argues in Premise 4, naturalism struggles to justify such non-empirical principles within its own framework. If the naturalist insists that all legitimate knowledge must be empirically verifiable or grounded, they face a difficulty in appealing to a principle like parsimony, which is a criterion of theoretical virtue, not an empirical fact. Using parsimony to critique pluralism requires the naturalist to step outside their own purported empirical-only standard, or at least rely on a principle they cannot ground naturally.  

    2. Problems with the Pragmatism Critique:

    • Conflation of Methodological and Metaphysical Pragmatism: Naturalists often point to the undeniable success of science (which operates using methodological naturalism – seeking natural explanations within its domain) as evidence for metaphysical naturalism (the philosophical claim that only natural things exist). As your text argues in Premise 2, this is a category error. Methodological naturalism is pragmatic for the specific goal of studying the physical world empirically. Metaphysical naturalism is a comprehensive worldview claim. The pragmatism of the former doesn’t automatically transfer to the latter. Pluralism fully embraces methodological naturalism for understanding the physical realm but recognizes that other realms (subjective experience, logic, morality) require different, though equally valid, approaches.  
    • Pragmatism for What Purpose? If pragmatism means “what works as a comprehensive worldview,” then naturalism is arguably not pragmatic because it fails to provide a coherent or satisfactory account of fundamental aspects of human reality (consciousness, meaning, values, reason’s validity), as detailed in Premise 3. It might be pragmatic for building bridges or predicting planetary motion, but it’s arguably deeply unpragmatic for understanding what it means to be a conscious, rational, moral agent in a world with objective truths. Pluralism, by acknowledging different domains and methods, is arguably more pragmatically successful as a philosophical framework because it provides conceptual resources to engage meaningfully with the full spectrum of human experience and inquiry, not just the physically quantifiable parts.
    • Naturalism May Rely on Pragmatism for its Own Foundations: Your text suggests (Premises 1 & 4) that naturalists, when pushed on how they justify the reliability of reason or the empirical method itself, might retreat to a pragmatic defense (“these methods just work”). If naturalism must ultimately appeal to pragmatism to ground its own core principles, it’s in a weak position to then turn around and critique pluralism solely on pragmatic grounds, especially when pluralism can argue it is more pragmatically successful in making sense of all of reality. This creates a kind of “pragmatism of the gaps” where pragmatism is invoked precisely where naturalism’s internal justification fails.

    In summary, the naturalist critiques of pluralism based on parsimony and pragmatism often miss the mark. Naturalism’s parsimony is frequently achieved by ignoring significant data or by subtly expanding its ontology, undermining the claim to unique simplicity. Its appeal to pragmatism often confuses the success of scientific method (which pluralism utilizes) with the philosophical adequacy of metaphysical naturalism as a total worldview, and ignores naturalism’s own potential reliance on pragmatic grounds it cannot fully justify. Pluralism, while positing a richer ontology, can argue it offers a more genuinely explanatory parsimony and a more comprehensive pragmatism by acknowledging the irreducible complexity of reality.

    Metaphysical pluralism doesn’t entail supernaturalism or theism by necessity. One can reject both naturalism and supernaturalism by acknowledging that reality may include non-physical aspects (consciousness, mathematical truths, values) without positing supernatural entities. Philosophers like Thomas Nagel, John Searle, and David Chalmers have developed non-materialist frameworks that don’t entail theism.

    Conclusion

    Naturalism fails as a comprehensive worldview. Its success in explaining physical phenomena doesn’t justify its extension to all aspects of reality. Its persistent explanatory gaps in consciousness, rationality, and value—coupled with its inability to justify its own foundations—reveal its fundamental inadequacy.

    A truly rational approach follows evidence where it leads, even when it points beyond the boundaries of naturalistic explanation. This isn’t an abandonment of rationality but its fulfillment—acknowledging that different aspects of reality may require different modes of understanding.

    Metaphysical pluralism offers a more coherent framework that honors the multidimensional character of reality. It maintains the empirical rigor of science within its proper domain while recognizing that human experience encompasses dimensions that transcend physical reduction. In doing so, it avoids both the reductionism of strict naturalism and the supernaturalism it rightly criticizes, providing a middle path that better accounts for the full spectrum of human knowledge and experience.

  • Presuppositionalism: A Tool for Christian Apologetics?

    Presuppositionalism: A Tool for Christian Apologetics?

    In the landscape of Christian apologetics, presuppositional apologetics presents a distinctive approach to understanding knowledge, reality, and belief. This philosophical method, pioneered by thinkers like Cornelius Van Til in the 1920s, challenges fundamental assumptions about epistemology and seeks to demonstrate the unique explanatory power of a biblical worldview.

    Understanding Presuppositionalism

    Presuppositional apologetics advances a bold claim: Christian theism provides the only coherent framework for understanding logic, morality, and the nature of knowledge itself. Unlike classical apologetic approaches that seek to prove God’s existence through external evidence, this method argues that the very possibility of rational thought depends on acknowledging a divine foundation.

    The core principle is that every individual, consciously or unconsciously, operates from a set of foundational beliefs about reality. These presuppositions shape how we interpret evidence, understand causality, and construct meaning. Presuppositionalists argue that a naturalistic worldview ultimately fails to provide a stable ground for rational inquiry.

    The Philosophical Challenge of Solipsism

    At the heart of this approach lies a profound philosophical challenge: the problem of solipsism. If we cannot definitively prove the existence of anything beyond our own mind, how can we claim to know anything with certainty? This epistemological dilemma threatens to reduce all knowledge to a subjective, potentially illusory experience.

    Traditional empiricist approaches, as critiqued by philosophers like David Hume, struggle to overcome this fundamental uncertainty. Empiricism, which relies solely on sensory experience and observation, cannot conclusively escape the possibility that our perceptions are merely internal constructs with no correspondence to an external reality.

    The Divine Foundation of Knowledge

    The presuppositional argument proposes a radical solution: God’s existence as the transcendent Creator provides the necessary foundation for objective knowledge. This perspective argues that:

    1. An objective reality exists independent of human perception
    2. Universal principles of logic and morality are grounded in God’s unchanging nature
    3. Human reasoning gains its validity from a divine source of rationality

    By positioning God as the ultimate source of knowledge, this approach attempts to resolve the solipsistic dilemma. The created world, according to this view, is not a mental construct but a real, intentionally designed system that reflects divine intelligence.

    Scientific and Philosophical Implications

    While traditional creation science is often criticized, presuppositional apologetics seeks to integrate philosophical reasoning with scientific inquiry. Concepts like baraminology (the study of created kinds) and catastrophic plate tectonics are presented as attempts to provide alternative explanatory frameworks for natural phenomena.

    However, it is crucial to recognize that these arguments remain contentious within the broader scientific community. The strength of the presuppositional approach lies not in its empirical evidence but in its philosophical critique of naturalistic epistemology.

    Critiques and Limitations

    The presuppositional method is not without significant challenges:

    1. It can appear circular, assuming the very thing it seeks to prove
    2. It may not convincingly engage with those who do not share its initial theological premises
    3. It risks oversimplifying complex philosophical and scientific questions

    Despite these limitations, the approach offers a provocative challenge to purely materialistic worldviews, forcing a deeper examination of the foundations of knowledge.

    Conclusion

    Presuppositional apologetics represents a sophisticated attempt to ground human understanding in a transcendent perspective. By challenging the foundations of knowledge and highlighting the limitations of naturalistic epistemology, it invites a more nuanced conversation about the nature of reality, reason, and belief.

    While not universally convincing, this approach provides a thought-provoking framework for those seeking to understand the relationship between faith, philosophy, and scientific inquiry.

  • The Paradox of Free Will

    The Paradox of Free Will

    The question of free will has perplexed theologians and philosophers for centuries. For one concerned with a proper exegesis of the Bible, the concept of free will is crucial for understanding human responsibility, divine justice, and the nature of God’s relationship with humanity.

    The Bible consistently presents humans as moral agents capable of making choices. Several passages highlight this:  

    • Deuteronomy 30:19: “I call heaven and earth to witness against you today, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that you and your offspring may live.”
    • Joshua 24:15: “And if it is evil in your eyes to serve the Lord, choose this day whom you will serve, whether the gods your fathers served in the region beyond the River, or the gods of the Amorites in whose land you dwell. But as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord.”
    • Revelation 3:20: “Behold, I stand at the door and knock. If anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in to him and eat with him, and he with me.”
    • 2 Peter 3:9: “The Lord is not slow to fulfill his promise as some count slowness, but is patient toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance.”

    These verses establish that God has instilled in his image-bearing creation an ability to make moral choices. God has made these choices available to us and we are culpable for our sin in disobedience. This is, at the very least, a strong indication that mankind is accountable to God. Therefore, ruling out any form of determinism that denies human accountability.

    Theological Considerations

    The tension between God’s sovereignty and human free will is a central theological challenge. There is not a simple yes or no that we can give to the question of free will, because it exists in the particular. While God is omniscient and omnipotent, the Bible also affirms human accountability. Further, God can intercede in human activity, even moral activity.

    A common example of this is God’s hardening of the Pharaoh’s heart in Exodus. God foreknew Pharaoh’s hardened heart, but Pharaoh’s initial choices were what led to divine hardening. God’s foreknowledge does not negate Pharaoh’s agency. This is what’s called prescience. God knowing the future, but did not cause the future.

    God is in total control of how he behaves and interacts with his creation. That does not mean he has to necessarily micromanage every aspect such that this world then becomes, “the greatest of all possible worlds.” If you take the view that God plays a direct role in every particular, you will run into a few problems.

    Take the popular analogy of God as an author and humans as characters. This is often used to argue against free will. It goes like this: imagine all of humankind and the universe, itself, are figures of the imagination of God. Sure, in the narrative a certain character may act in this or that way based on their motivations and choices, yet these motivations and choices were all designed by the author. The author can write the characters in whatever way is pleasing.

    However, this analogy breaks down when considering God’s desire for genuine relationship. This view results in the rather absurd conclusion that God must have created us solely for the entertainment value. If humans are merely puppets, their love for God is not authentic. True love requires reciprocal choice which requires free will. Therefore, a world without free will results in a parasitic phantasy in the mind of God.

    There are two counters to this perspective that I encounter often. They have to do with the power of God and the will of God. I will address, first, the will of God.

    It is indeed the case that nothing can happen apart from God’s will. So when this criticism gets brought up the framing is such that it appears, therefore, God wills for all the choices which you have made in your life to have happened and in the manner in which they happened. However, there is a hidden assumption. Does God actually will that, or is what God values a more nuances proposition. I argue that God’s will can be to permit free agency. This is suggested heavily in scripture any time that God calls for a response from his creation. When God says “sin no more,” he is calling man to action. Why is it necessary for God to say this, if God is the only active agent in the process of who sins and who does not? Does it make sense for me to say to my bicycle, “stop pedaling.” According to some, it is not the bike doing the pedaling and, likewise, it is not the man doing the sinning (although the bike is moving and the man is acting they are not casually powerful).

    So does man having free will to choose actions that move away from God’s set path make God less powerful? This claim is often made against those who endorse a free-will-agency view. It is suggested that, if man can act apart from God’s purpose for their life (even if it’s not against God’s will) there still arises a problem in which God could plausibly create a world where every freewill agent he created would freely choose him. God can rig the game in his favor, so to speak. Apart from the fact that if this counterexample is true, it has graver consequence on the validity of a reformed view, there is a logical error in this understanding of the nature of free will.

    If God were to guarantee a specific outcome, such as every human freely choosing him, then the choice would no longer be truly free. It would be a predetermined response, a mere illusion of choice. True free will necessitates the genuine possibility of choosing otherwise, including the potential for rejection. To remove this possibility is to remove the essence of free will itself, rendering it meaningless. Therefore, to argue that God’s power is diminished by allowing genuine free will is to misunderstand that genuine free will requires the possibility of choosing against God.

    Three Main Arguments For Free Will:

    1. If God ordains every human action, including evil ones, then God becomes the author of evil. For the young earth creationist there is a clear perspective which attributes evil to the misuse of free will, consistent with the Genesis narrative of the Fall. God allows evil, but he does not create it.
    2. As Dr. Michael S. Heiser argues, humans are created in God’s image, which includes attributes like intelligence, emotion, and creativity. It is consistent that free will is also a component of this image. To deny free will is to diminish human dignity and responsibility. It is also rather arbitrary to leave out a significant part of man’s God-image for no apparent reason. 
    3. The sacrifice of Jesus Christ is presented as sufficient for all humanity. If salvation is not universally applied, it is due to individual rejection, not divine limitation. God’s desire that none shall perish, is a strong argument for free will.

    Conclusion

    In conclusion, the biblical narrative, particularly the passages emphasizing human choice and accountability, strongly supports the concept of free will. While the tension between divine sovereignty and human agency presents a complex theological challenge, the young-Earth creationist perspective offers a coherent framework for understanding this relationship. By recognizing God’s permissive will, acknowledging the importance of genuine relationship, and affirming the image of God in humanity, we can reconcile these seemingly contradictory truths. The rejection of a deterministic worldview, which reduces humans to mere puppets, underscores the significance of free will in the context of divine justice and love. Potentially, the concept of created heterozygosity and information theory can provide a scientific framework and biological basis for understanding the inherent capacity for diverse moral choices within the created order (although this is speculation). Ultimately, the existence of free will, while a mystery in some respects, is essential for understanding human responsibility, the nature of God’s relationship with humanity, and the very essence of love itself.

  • A Personal Reflection on Kierkegaard’s “Leap” of Faith

    A Personal Reflection on Kierkegaard’s “Leap” of Faith

    Reading Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” particularly his exploration of the “leap” of faith, resonates deeply with my own understanding of what it means to embrace a Christian worldview. It’s not merely about intellectual assent to historical or scientific propositions; it’s a profound, personal relationship that transcends the limitations of objective knowledge.

    Kierkegaard, through Climacus, articulates the “leap” as a radical discontinuity, a “shifting from one genus to another.” This echoes my own experience in realizing that, although science is fascinating, it is not what we’ll get our final grade on. Just as Climacus argues that historical facts, no matter how compelling, cannot generate faith, I’ve found that scientific evidence, while supportive, doesn’t compel belief on its own. Faith is not a matter of knowing the truth or knowing anything–it’s a leap. This leap is a move from the objective to the subjective, from the realm of empirical observation to the domain of personal commitment.

    The “ugly broad ditch” metaphor, about the unbridgeable gap between objective and subjective (relational, personal, i.e., of the subject) truth, illustrates the seemingly insurmountable divide between rational inquiry and the act of faith. No amount of scientific evidence or logical argumentation can bridge this gap. The leap is not a gradual progression but a decisive moment, a qualitative shift that defies rational calculation. It’s not about accumulating evidence until the scale tips; it’s about recognizing the inherent limitations of objective knowledge and choosing to embrace a truth that transcends it.

    Climacus’s critique of “earnestness” is particularly helpful. He argues that intellectual striving is “droll enough” in the context of the leap. I’ve encountered many who seek to intellectualize faith, to reduce it to a system of logical propositions. But faith, as Kierkegaard understands it, is not a product of intellectual prowess. It’s a matter of the will, a subjective commitment that transcends the realm of reason. One cannot “earnestly” approach faith; one either makes the leap or one does not. Yet, that is not to undermine neither the objective world nor the subjective relationship.

    Climacus’ satirical jab at those who attempt to “grab oneself by the neck a la Münchhausen” (a fictional character known for pulling himself out of a swamp by his own hair) speaks to the absurdity of trying to force faith through intellectual gymnastics. It’s a warning against self-deception, against pretending to have made the leap without truly engaging with its radical, personal nature. This resonates with a perspective which acknowledges the limitations of scientific and theological models and the necessity of a personal encounter with the Creator.

    You often here the accusation so and so has “blind faith” or that faith is not based on evidence. For me, the leap of faith is not a blind leap into irrationality. It’s a recognition that objective knowledge, while valuable, is insufficient to grasp the fullness of reality. It’s an acknowledgment that there are truths that transcend empirical observation, truths that can only be apprehended through a subjective act of commitment. In the context of creationism, the leap involves acknowledging the limitations of naturalistic explanations and embracing the possibility of a Creator whose handiwork is evident in the complexity and beauty of the natural world.

    This is valuable because we often feel the pressure to demonstrate the historical or the scientific aspect of our worldview as firmly in the historical or scientific. It is not. It is more. It is a leap into a new genus (Aristotelian category) of reality. It is a new domain of experience in addition to and separate from what we experience in religion, science, and the day-to-day.

    The leap is a deeply personal decision, one that each individual must make for themselves. It’s a journey that involves wrestling with doubt, questioning assumptions, and ultimately choosing to embrace a truth that resonates with the deepest parts of one’s being. It’s a move from stranglehold the “objective” has on our society into a complementary view which includes the “subjective”, a move that is essential for true faith.

    Citation

    1. Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, 1992.
  • Do Creationists Make Predictions?

    Do Creationists Make Predictions?

    A common criticism against scientists who espouse a young-age and global flood is that they don’t make testable predictions. However, a closer look reveals that creation science has a robust history of making predictions that challenge mainstream assumptions. To respond to the critic’s claim, we will look at eight predictions of note which are rooted in a biblical perspective of history, have been repeatedly validated, and prompt the need for a re-evaluation of the established paradigm.

    1. The Rapid Formation of Opals

    Dr. Len Crampton, a creationist geologist from New South Wales, Australia, dared to question the conventional timescale for opal formation. Mainstream geology posits that opals form over millions of years through slow, gradual processes. However, Crampton, drawing upon the catastrophic implications of the global Flood, predicted that opals could form rapidly under conditions of silica-rich solutions and rapid deposition. His experimental work demonstrated the feasibility of this rapid formation, challenging the long-age assumptions of conventional geology. While consensus geology made a story about opals which fit their narrative, creationists found the practical mechanism behind opal creation.

    2. Carbon-14 in “Ancient” Samples

    One of the most contentious areas of debate is the presence of Carbon-14 (C-14) in samples deemed millions of years old. Conventional radiometric dating assumes that C-14, with its relatively short half-life of 5,730 years, should be undetectable in samples older than 100,000 years. Yet, creation scientists, including those involved with the RATE (Radioisotopes and the Age of The Earth) project, have consistently predicted and found measurable C-14 in fossils, coal, and diamonds (Baumgardner, 2003). This finding directly challenges the long-age interpretations and raises questions about the assumptions underlying radiometric dating, but, significantly, it was predicted by creationists.

    3. Mature Galaxies and the Absence of Population III Stars

    In the realm of cosmology, Dr. Jason Lisle predicted that the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) would reveal mature galaxies at great distances and a lack of Population III stars, the hypothetical first stars formed after the Big Bang. This prediction stands in stark contrast to standard cosmological models, which require long periods for galaxy formation and predict the existence of these primordial stars. The early JWST data has aligned with Lisle’s prediction, prompting a re-evaluation of current cosmological timelines. Another prediction in the bag.

    4. The Functionality of “Junk” DNA

    Evolutionary theory initially proposed that non-coding DNA was “junk,” remnants of evolutionary processes with no function. However, creation scientists, including Dr. Robert Carter, predicted that this “junk” DNA would be found to have important functions (Carter, 2010). The ENCODE project and subsequent research have demonstrated widespread biochemical activity within non-coding DNA, indicating its crucial roles in gene regulation and other cellular processes. This discovery challenges the notion of “junk” DNA and supports the concept of intelligent design.

    5. Helium Diffusion in Zircon Crystals

    Back to geology. In 1982, Dr. Robert Gentry discovered that the nuclear-decay-generated helium in little crystals in granites called zircons was too high for the rocks to have undergone a constant decay rate (Gentry, 1986). His observation lead to Dr. Russell Humphreys prediction during the early stages of the RATE project (Humphreys, 2000, p. 348, Figure 7), which were verified by an external laboratory, challenged the conventional radiometric dating assumptions. The high retention rates of helium in zircon crystals indicate that they cannot be millions of years old. The data fit his prediction, as shown below, perfectly.

    6. Cool Subducted Zones and Rapid Plate Tectonics

    Dr. John Baumgardner, a geophysicist, predicted that subducted lithospheric zones in the mantle would be cooler than expected (Baumgardner, 1994), due to rapid plate tectonics during the Flood. Observations have confirmed these cooler zones, supporting the Catastrophic Plate Tectonics (CPT) model.

    7. Lack of Metamorphosis in Folded Rock Layers

    Geologist Dr. Andrew Snelling predicted that Tapeats sandstone samples in bends would not exhibit metamorphic change to the minerals, despite the folding of the layers. This is because he predicted that all the sedimentary layers were laid down during the flood and that seismic activity below caused the layers to deform over the hardened faults below. Snelling et al. investigated the Tapeats and found no metamorphosing (Snelling, 2021). This evidence supports the prediction that these rocks were bent while still soft and it refutes the mainstream science prediction of ductile deformation (immense pressure and heat over time which should result in metamorphic changes), demonstrating that the folding occurred rapidly, before the rocks had time to metamorphose.

    8. Human Genetic Diversity

    Creation models predicted a relatively recent origin for humanity, with low genetic diversity. Genetic studies, including those on mitochondrial DNA and the Y chromosome, have supported this prediction, pointing to a relatively recent common ancestry.

    These are my top eight examples which highlight the predictive power of the creationist model. These predictions and their verifications dispel the myth that “creationists don’t make predictions” and, hopefully, give you a deeper appreciation for the robustness and explanatory power of the creationist worldview.

    Citations:

    1. John Baumgardner, J. R. (2003). Carbon-14 evidence for a recent global flood and a young age of the Earth. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Creationism (pp. 129-142). Creation Science Fellowship.
    2. Carter, R. W. (2010). The non-coding genome. Journal of Creation, 24(3), 116-123.
    3. Gentry, R. V. (1986). Radiohalos in polonium 218: evidence of a pre-cambrian granite. Science, 234(4776), 561-566.
    4. Humphreys, D. R. (2000). Accelerated nuclear decay: evidence for young-age radiocarbon dating. In Radioisotopes and the Age of The Earth: Results of a Young-Earth Creationist Research Initiative (pp. 333-379). Institute for Creation Research. p. 348, Figure 7.
    5. Baumgardner, J. R. (1994). Runaway subduction as the driving mechanism for the Genesis flood. In Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Creationism (pp. 63-75). Creation Science Fellowship.
    6. Snelling, A. A. (2021). The Petrology of the Tapeats Sandstone, Tonto Group, Grand Canyon, Arizona. Answers Research Journal, 14, 159–254.