Creation Questions

Tag: christianity

  • Is Young Earth Creationism Irrational and Harmful?

    Is Young Earth Creationism Irrational and Harmful?

    Recently the popular creation skeptic Randal Rauser, who goes by the Youtube moniker of “The Tentative Apologist,” posted a video titled, “Why Young Earth Creationism is Irrational and Harmful.” In it, he laid out his case for why evangelicals should not embrace young earth creation as well as a general methodology for laymen wherein they conform to the expert opinion—specifically the expert majority opinion. While I do believe he is good-hearted and well meaning, the video exemplified the innate depravity of the modern “scientismist” view. He covered the bases so well and so thoroughly that I thought it apt to do an in-depth exegesis and logical analysis of the claims he made. My hope is that this case study can be instructive on how to critically think, this is not meant to be a dunk on Rauser.

    Argument #1: Social Contingency

    He begins his criticism of the young earth creationist movement by citing the book “The Creationists” by Ronald Numbers. Dr. Numbers is a historian of science who was the son of a fundamentalist Seventh-day Adventist preacher and later left becoming a self-proclaimed agnostic. Numbers’ thesis is that the modern movement of creationism began as an Adventist movement. Rauser notes:

    “The modern creationist movement actually comes from Seventh Day Adventism and particularly young earth creationist George McCready Price… As a result, young earth creationism became the mainstream view held by the emerging fundamentalist movement of the 1920-30s which was a reaction to the growth and perceived compromise of mainstream denominations and university-based divinity schools.”

    The real beginnings of modern creationism started not by an Adventist in the 20s but by Baptists in the 60s. Although Rauser acknowledges this, he points out that “The Genesis Flood” by Morris and Whitcomb was heavily influenced by Price’s work several decades earlier. While it is true that Price played a large role in the model put forth in the 60s, it is important to note that Price, Morris, and Whitcomb were not writing in a vacuum. 

    Who was Price influenced by? And if we are to say (rightly) not by Adventists, then you cannot simply argue that modern young earth creationism is an adventist movement.

    Price was citing Anglicans, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Reformed geologists. To name a few non-adventist geologists: Thomas Burnet (Telluris Theoria Sacra, 1681), John Woodward (An Essay Toward a Natural History of the Earth, 1695), William Whiston, Granville Penn, George Fairholme, Sharon Turner, George Young, George Bugg, John Murray, David Lord, and Tayler Lewis.

    Seventh-Day Adventism wasn’t alone in holding to young earth creationism at that time, either. Many traditional Christian denominations—including Anglicans, Lutherans, and Eastern Orthodox all held semi-official doctrines or official dogmas on the young age of the earth. Figures like the Anglican Bishop James Ussher, Lutheran doctrines and dogmas such as the Westminster Standards (1643–1649) and the 1967 resolution of the LCMS affirmed the six day creation and young earth, and the Orthodox Anno Mundi calendar (held as the official calendar in most Eastern traditions) dates creation to approximately 5508 BC. Some modern Orthodox theologians argue that a literal reading of Genesis 1–2 remains the historic teaching of the church up until the 19th century.

    While it is true, Price definitely filtered the former creationist flood models and understandings through his adventist interpretive framework, yet Morris and Whitcomb filtered Price through their Baptist/Evangelical framework.

    This is all very important to bring up because Ronald Numbers’ view of the history of creationism is a very prevalent one in current culture and it is told by people who either fallaciously aim to discredit the movement as a prophetic fad or seek to over emphasize credit to Price, likewise to dismiss the important work of early creationist field geologists. Both of which count as genetic fallacies, of which we will cover shortly.

    So, then, why does Rauser, himself, open with this remark (of all remarks)?

    His answer:

    “It doesn’t make young earth creationism right or wrong—it doesn’t tell you anything per se about the science, but it does show you the social contingent historical origins of the young earth creationist movement. And for people who are taught, then, that young earth creationism just is the standard historical orthodox christian perspective to understand and see through the lenses of a historian just how contingent and limited the origins of this modern movement are, really helps to contextualize it and raise the level of prima facie skepticism that one should have about this movement.”

    Rauser is being fair when he points out this cannot be evidence of the truth of young earth creationism. And, for a second, I just want you to pause on that.

    He has realized that if he were to do so, it would be a genetic fallacy. That is, it would be a dismissal of the arguments and evidence of creationism, not on the basis of evidence, but on the basis of source or origin.

    Unfortunately for Rauser, the point he ends up making is likewise… a genetic fallacy. To argue that a movement, especially and particularly of the movement of scientific inquiry, can be discredited because the scientists who penned it were unorthodox is to deny the entire enterprise of science altogether.

    He argues fallaciously to what end?

    In order to “raise the level of prima facie skepticism.” Prima facie is latin for “at first sight.” What Rauser is communicating to us is that we should make a prior commitment to the falsity of the creationist movement. 

    Based on what grounds? 

    On the fallacious grounds of a socially contingent historical analysis, that is moreover historiographically asymmetric and based on the presuppositions of a former seventh day agnostic critical scholar. This is essentially a non-attempt to engage with any evidence (apart from pseudo history). In the philosophy of science, all movements are socially contingent.

    To his credit he mentions Bishop James Ussher, however methinks he doth protest too much.

    “And just to be cautious here, I do clarify that this is modern. There have been young earth creationists throughout history. The most famous example is Arch Bishop James Ussher, a British theologian and Bishop who attempted to date the origins of the universe to 4004 BC, writing in the seventeenth century. But his views aren’t the same as the modern young earth creationist movement that really traces to this influx of seventh day adventist prophetic theology into modern fundamentalism.”

    Well, I’ve got exciting news, Rauser! Modern creationists don’t hold to Price’s view either. In fact, modern flood geology is based on models of catastrophic plate tectonics (CPT) which were exposited by Dr. John Baumgardner in the 90s. The model has been refined since then, but it is the model of neither Price nor Morris and Whitcomb.

    This is what’s often called, in philosophy, a symmetry-breaker. You see, Rauser wanted so badly to articulate that early creationists, that are not Adventists, don’t count because they have different models. But if that rule were applied evenly, the start of the modern creationist movement would be pushed to the late 90s! If Rauser defines a movement by its specific mechanics (e.g., Price’s specific model), then he cannot logically link Morris and Whitcomb to Price while simultaneously distancing Ussher from Morris.

    Argument #2: Appeal To Experts

    Rauser begins his next line of argument with a question:

    “The first thing I want to ask whenever people come up with a minority view is: ‘what do the experts say on a particular issue?’ This is true across the board. We should be very careful about engaging in special pleading where we apply a different standard in one area than another just because that suits our bias.”

    The first thing I would like to ask Rauser is: what is an expert?

    To evaluate who the experts are and which experts to defer to, you already need independent critical judgment. Yet, to say that we should rely on experts is an explicitly uncritical statement.

    Rauser warns against special pleading, yet his own methodology treats historical science as if it were identical to operational science. We defer to “experts” like surgeons or pilots because their expertise is constantly validated by immediate, repeatable results. If a surgeon is “irrational,” the patient dies; if a pilot is “irrational,” the plane crashes.

    In contrast, “experts” in historical geology or evolutionary biology are constructing narratives about the unobservable past. There is no immediate “feedback loop” from reality to verify their conclusions. By demanding the same level of uncritical deference for historical narrative as we give to operational technology, Rauser is the one engaging in a form of special pleading.

    This is not to say Geologists don’t make predictions about, say, where to find oil, what rock strata will look like in unexplored regions, which fossils should exist in which layers… and those predictions get tested. But these are distinct from the narrative they tell about the data. The framework is what is in question in the origins debate, not the facts on the ground.

    To make Rauser’s argument clear, we can formulate it in a syllogism:

    Premise 1: Most minority views are wrong.

    Premise 2: Creationism is a minority view.

    Conclusion: Therefore, it is rational to assume Creationism is wrong.

    While, you might suppose premise one to be statistically probable generally, the problem is that it’s an extremely weak inference that does almost no epistemic work, especially when the minority view comes with substantive arguments that need engaging on their merits.

    It only takes a few history books to see that in every case, the maverick was right and the credentialed majority was wrong. Wegener had his continental drift theory rejected for decades by the geological establishment despite compelling evidence, Galileo was faced against ecclesiastical and academic authority simultaneously, Fleming was largely ignored for over a decade after discovering penicillin, and J Harlen Bretz proposed a massive catastrophic flood event which was ridiculed by the geological establishment for roughly 40 years. Other examples which we more readily accepted, but still independent thinkers are Copernicus, Bacon, Newton, Einstein, Pasteur, McClintock, Marshall and Warren with H. pylori.

    That’s not to mention the founders of the mainstream paradigm: Hutton, Lyell, Darwin, Wallace, and Mendel. Hutton and Lyell had to fight tooth and nail against flood geology in intense philosophical debate. Darwin and Wallace spent decades contesting the theory of natural selection. Mendel was entirely ignored for 35 years and only rediscovered posthumously. Yet, these are their icons. This is literally historical amnesia. How can Rauser seriously be saying that we should just default to the consensus? How could any science be done that way?

    This is not to say that creationism is right or that the minority is right. I only claim the epistemically humble position: the experts aren’t always right. However, can we embrace his less abrasive claims?

    “Experts are not infallible, but all things being equal, you want to go with the experts… You don’t want to go, all things being equal, with the very significant minority.”

    This is a particular and different claim. Notice that in the equation he’s drawn, there are no non-experts. But he argues, the majority of experts will be a better place to hang one’s hat—all things being equal.

    All things being equal.

    I want to highlight a couple angles on this qualifying phrase that Rauser uses. First, what does it mean for all else to be equal? How is that metric reached?

    In order to evaluate equality, we need some metric to evaluate the models in question. This means evaluating their explanatory power, internal consistency, relation to the data, and presuppositions. Yet, by the time you’ve done this, you are no longer relying on the experts, you are doing the work of an expert. 

    Rauser is asking the layman to exercise a form of meta-expertise. He is suggesting that while a layman isn’t qualified to judge the geology, they are qualified to judge the geologists.

    This is a precarious position. If a layman is not equipped to understand the nuances of Catastrophic Plate Tectonics (CPT) vs. Uniformitarianism, how are they equipped to judge the social and institutional pressures that produce a “majority”?

    What’s more, in the origins debate, “all else” is never equal because the starting presuppositions are diametrically opposed. You can’t even get any kind of equality when the foundations of either edifice cannot be compared to begin with.

    Argument #3: You Have To Teach!

    He closes that section off with a criterion for engagement:

    “Here’s a basic way to test your expertise: how prepared are you right now to give a one hour introductory lecture to any of these fields… geochemistry, or geochronology, or molecular biology?… The ability to give a one hour lecture is at least a minimal threshold to even have a further conversation.”

    Rauser’s “one-hour lecture” rule is an elitist filter that ignores how human knowledge actually functions. You do not need a degree in geochemistry to identify a logical contradiction in a geochemist’s paper, nor do you need to be a molecular biologist to understand the statistical impossibility of certain evolutionary transitions.

    Take the example of a court of law. In a court of law, we do not require jurors to be able to give a one-hour lecture on DNA sequencing or ballistics. We expect them to use their independent critical judgment to weigh the testimony of competing experts.

    Furthermore, most experts are hyper-specialized. A molecular biologist might not be able to give a one-hour lecture on geochronology, yet Rauser would likely still accept their “expert” opinion on the age of the earth simply because they belong to the same “consensus club.”

    Argument #4: You Have To Explain!

    “If you are a young earth creationist and you’re dismissing 98-99% of experts, you then have to give an explanation for how 98-99% experts could be wrong about some significant issue like the age of the universe, the age of earth, and the origin of species upon the planet. And this is where we’re going to tend to come into accounts which are boarding in the dangerous area of conspiracy theories.”

    Rauser says you “have to give an explanation” for how the experts could be wrong. The explanation is actually quite simple and historically grounded: Science is not a democracy. Truth is not determined by the number of PhDs who agree, but by the correspondence of a model to the physical data.

    When the majority holds to a flawed paradigm, they will consistently interpret all new data to fit that paradigm (a process called “epicyclic adjustment”). It takes a maverick to step outside the circle and show that the data actually fits a different, more robust model—like Catastrophic Plate Tectonics.

    By labeling this “conspiratorial,” Rauser is effectively saying that the only rational choice is to never challenge a majority. This is the very definition of historical amnesia.

    “Maybe you’re influenced by Thomas Kuhn’s historical understanding of the progress of science and you say ‘all these evolutionists are just locked into a naturalistic paradigm and they can’t see all the evidence for young earth creationism.’ But what that effectively does is it’s going to breed skepticism about expertise generally which is probably going to spill into other areas… in favor of various conspiracy theories.”

    Please, reader, take a big gulp of the irony here. There is enough to go around.

    The skeptic is worried about skepticism. The very people who will argue that Christianity or theism are ridiculous. The very people who can hold much incredulity to the largest consensus belief in the world are now going to explain why skepticism is a bad methodology.

    By warning against skepticism, Rauser is effectively discouraging the very “critical thinking” he claims to promote. To be “critically minded” is, by definition, to be skeptical of claims—especially those that demand uncritical deference.

    If an expert cannot explain the data to a thinking layman without resorting to “trust me, I’m an expert,” then their expertise has become a form of sophistry.

    Argument #5: The Harmful Belief

    “All of this means that allowing young earth creationism to proliferate unchallenged among the evangelical and fundamentalist protestant Christian subculture does enormous damage to the integrity and the witness of Christianity in North America.”

    This last point is supremely interesting. Does he think, first of all, that creationism has gone unchallenged in Western society? Even among evangelical and fundamentalist movements, there is a clear pressure to conform to the infallible doctrine of scientism.

    Does he think the Christians will gain ground in culture, if we give up ground? Will we convert more to the truth, if we tell lies?

    Let’s call out this appeal to the harm of young earth creationism for what it is—eurocentric scientific elitism. This argument only carries weight in the West, and it should really carry weight nowhere, because it is simply not an argument.

    Final Thoughts:

    Rauser’s case study is a masterclass in Scientism—the belief that the methods and conclusions of the natural sciences are the only source of genuine knowledge. His methodology requires the layman to be a passive consumer of institutional output rather than an active, critical thinker.

    By deconstructing his arguments, we’ve shown that:

    1. His history is socially contingent and misses the broader tradition and trends.
    1. His “Expert Appeal” is circular and ignores the history of scientific revolutions.
    1. His “Lecture Test” is elitist gatekeeping which ignores how we evaluate data.
    1. His “Harm” argument prioritizes social comfort over consistency and truth.

    To summarize, we should evaluate each model based on the evidence, parsimony, predictive success, presuppositions, coherence, consilience, etc—take your pick. We should not be evaluating the models on external factors such as perceived harm, individual comprehension, appeals to consensus, appeals to experts, and appeals to novelty or social contingency. These in the latter list do not help us in the project of “how to think.” And the project of “who to trust” has always been a very dangerous game.

  • Jesus Is The Logos

    Jesus Is The Logos

    Based on a cross-sectional analysis of Revelation, John, Hebrews, Colossians, and 1 Timothy, the conclusion that the Logos is a pre-existent, divine person, Jesus Christ, is not merely suggested, but is textually inescapable.

    Let me explain:

    The argument begins with the most direct statement of identity and nature:

    “In the beginning was the WORD, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” — John 1:1

    This verse establishes two critical facts: The Word is eternal and the Word is distinct in personhood but shares divinity.

    This divine person is definitively named at the climactic moment of Christ’s return:

    “He was clothed with a robe dipped in blood, and His name is called The Word of God.” — Revelation 19:13

    Jesus is explicitly named the “Word of God.” Jesus is linked to the Word across multiple apostolic authors. John introduces the concept immediately:

    “All things were made through Him, and without Him nothing was made that was made.” — John 1:3

    The Apostle Paul and the author of Hebrews use the identical theological framework to describe Jesus:

    Colossians 1:16: “For by Him all things were created that are in heaven and that are on earth… All things were created through Him and for Him.”

    1 Corinthians 8:6: “…one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and through whom we live.”

    Hebrews 1:2: “…spoken to us by His Son, through whom also He made the worlds.”

    Jesus is the sole, ultimate agent “through whom all things consist and were created.” Jesus of Nazareth must, therefore, be the Logos of John 1:1-3. This divine Creator is also the perfect revelation of the Father, known through the Incarnation.

    “The WORD became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory of the one and only Son, who came from the Father…” — John 1:14

    The mystery of godliness, that God appeared in the flesh (1 Timothy 3:16), is explained by the Logos taking on humanity. Furthermore, He is defined by His relationship to the invisible God:

    “He is the image of the invisible God…” — Colossians 1:15

    “[He is] the brightness of His glory and the express image of His person, and upholding all things by the word of His power…” — Hebrews 1:3

    The Greek word for “express image” in Hebrews 1:3 is charaktēr, meaning an exact replica or the imprint left by a stamp or engraving tool. This confirms that the person of Jesus (the Word) is the precise, perfect, and essential representation of the invisible Father.

    The evidence forms an irrefutable loop: The one who is called the Word of God (Revelation) is the one who is God (John 1:1). This same figure is the one through whom all things were created (John 1:3, Colossians 1:16, 1 Corinthians 8:6). Finally, this divine Creator became flesh (John 1:14) to reveal the exact image of God (Hebrews 1:3). The biblical testimony is unified, establishing the inescapable truth that Jesus Christ is the eternal, divine WORD (Logos).

  • J. Budziszewski’s Natural Theology of Sex: A Pathway to Biblical Understanding

    J. Budziszewski’s Natural Theology of Sex: A Pathway to Biblical Understanding

    J. Budziszewski, in his insightful work On the Meaning of Sex, presents a compelling natural theological framework that grounds sexual ethics in the inherent design and purpose of human beings. This approach, by meticulously analyzing the given structure of human nature, offers a robust pathway that can successfully lead to a Biblical understanding of sexuality and gender. Budziszewski argues that meaning is not arbitrarily assigned but is discovered through the inherent design of creation, and it is this foundational concept that shapes his comprehensive view of sexual morality.

    A) The Foundational Idea: Inherent Design and Purpose

    The bedrock of Budziszewski’s philosophy, especially concerning the questions of sexuality and gender, is the conviction that meaning is intrinsic to reality, particularly to human nature itself. He firmly asserts, “Meaning isn’t arbitrary. Yes, we can associate sex in our minds with anything we choose—with pain, pleasure, tedium, amusement, alienation, reconciliation, fertility, sterility, misery, joy, life, death, or what have you. This is true of all things, not just sex. We can associate anything with anything” (7). However, he immediately clarifies that subjective association does not alter objective meaning. For Budziszewski, human nature is not an external master but “the deep structure of what we really are” (8). True freedom, then, is not the ability to transcend this nature, but rather the ability to align our wills with it, to allow “the meanings and purposes that lie fallow in sexuality [to] unfold” (8). He explains that the human will is not separate from nature but an integral part of it, asserting that the will’s nobility lies in its capacity to discern and direct itself according to the inherent wisdom embedded in our being.

    Budziszewski confronts common objections to this idea, particularly the notion that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” He dismantles this dogma by using simple, yet powerful, examples. When discussing the lungs, he posits, “When we say that their purpose is to oxygenate the blood, are we just making that up? Of course not. The purpose of oxygenation isn’t in the eye of the beholder; it’s in the design of the lungs themselves” (22). This emphasis on “the design of the lungs” is crucial; it implies that purpose is empirically discoverable. Furthermore, he contends that to violate this inherent design, such as by “sniffing glue,” does not change the lung’s purpose but only “violates it” (22). Similarly, regarding eyes, he argues, “If the purpose of eyes is to see, then eyes that see well are good eyes, and eyes that see poorly are poor ones. Given their purpose, this is what it means for eyes to be good. Moreover, good is to be pursued; the appropriateness of pursuing it is what it means for anything to be good. Therefore, the appropriate thing to do with poor eyes is try to turn them into good ones” (22). This demonstrates that understanding a thing’s inherent purpose necessarily implies an “ought”—an imperative to act in accordance with that purpose. He further distinguishes “purpose” from mere “function,” stating that purpose signifies something “ordered or directed to an end,” whereas function merely “signifies the mode in which purpose is present in things rather than in minds” (23). This foundational idea underpins his entire argument: that human beings, as integrated wholes of “mind and flesh united,” must respect the inherent design of their bodies, including their sexuality (23). While he acknowledges that some might dismiss his work as “religious” due to references to “God,” he insists that divine grace, if real, is “inescapably relevant to human life” and can be understood even through natural reasoning (11).

    B) Application to Gender and Sexuality

    Applying this foundational idea, Budziszewski posits that human sexuality possesses “embedded principles and the inbuilt meaning of the human sexual design” (21). He laments that “errors about sex cause such terrible suffering, in our day more than most” (12), and attributes this suffering to the flouting of these inherent meanings. He identifies two fundamental “natural meanings” of sex that are “so tightly stitched that we can start with either one and follow the threads to the other” (24): procreation and union.

    First, regarding procreation, Budziszewski asserts that it is the “bring about and nurture of new life, the formation of families in which children have moms and dads” (24). He outlines two conditions for establishing something’s purpose: it must actually bring about the effect, and the causal connection must explain its existence. Sexuality undeniably meets both: “the sexual powers do bring about procreation,” and “apart from the link between the sexual powers and new life, any explanation of why we have sexual powers at all would be woefully incomplete” (25). This procreative meaning, in turn, necessitates the concept of union. He argues, “For us, procreation requires an enduring partnership between two beings, the man and the woman, who are different, but in ways that enable them to complete and balance each other. Union, then, characterizes the distinctly human mode of procreation” (25). This enduring partnership between a man and a woman is essential not only for conception but also for the raising of children, as “the male is better suited to protection, the female to nurture” (26). Children also need models of both sexes and the relationship between them to thrive and eventually form their own families. He even cites sociologists Sara S. McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, who suggest that “If we were asked to design a system for making sure that children’s basic needs were met, we would probably come up with something quite similar to the two-parent ideal” (26).

    Conversely, Budziszewski demonstrates how starting with the unitive meaning also leads back to procreation. He states, “We join ourselves by doing what? By an act which is intrinsically open to the possibility of new life. In other words, whenever I give myself sexually, I am doing something that cannot help but mean that happy chance” (27). This implies that a true, total self-giving in union de facto means a bodily giving, which inherently carries the possibility of new life. He powerfully illustrates this with the concept of the body’s objective “speech”: “What you intend subjectively can’t change what your act means objectively…When the speech of the mouth contradicts the speech of the body, the body’s speech repeals the mouth’s. To crush your windpipe with my thumbs is to say to you, ‘Now die,’ even if I tell you with my mouth, ‘Be alive’” (27). Sexual union, therefore, objectively “speaks” of total, self-giving, life-affirming communion, regardless of subjective intent. By the end of this analysis, Budziszewski concludes that these are “the natural laws of sex” (33).

    C) Evaluation and Connection to Biblical Understanding

    Budziszewski’s position is remarkably helpful and coherent in discussing gender and sexuality, particularly as it provides a clear pathway to understanding these concepts from a Biblical perspective. His natural law approach, by grounding sexual ethics in discernible human design and purpose, offers a rational basis for moral norms that is not solely reliant on religious dogma, even as it ultimately aligns with it. He addresses the widespread confusion of our age, where “everything is topsy-turvy and confused,” by reminding us that “It is harder to write about what is obvious but unrecognized than about what is really obscure” (15). His method makes the “obvious” — the inherent meaning of sex — recognizable again.

    The direct alignment between Budziszewski’s “natural laws of sex” and Biblical principles is striking. The procreative meaning he identifies, “the bring about and nurture of new life, the formation of families in which children have moms and dads,” finds a direct echo in the Genesis mandate, “Be fruitful and multiply” (Genesis 1:28). This divine command is not an arbitrary rule but an affirmation of the inherent design for flourishing that God embedded within creation, particularly in human sexual powers. The natural purpose of bringing forth new life and fostering it within the structure of a family led by a mother and a father is, for Budziszewski, a self-evident truth discoverable through observation, much like the purpose of lungs or eyes.

    Similarly, his unitive meaning of sex—the “mutual and total self-giving and accepting of two polar, complementary selves in their entirety, soul and body”—is perfectly mirrored in the Biblical concept of “one flesh” (Genesis 2:24; Matthew 19:5-6). This Biblical phrase signifies not merely physical intimacy but a profound, holistic union of two distinct yet complementary individuals (male and female) into a new relational entity. Budziszewski’s argument that sexual union is “intrinsically open to the possibility of new life” and that subjective intent cannot override the objective “speech” of the body powerfully reinforces the sanctity and seriousness of the one-flesh union as depicted in scripture. The Bible’s understanding of marriage as the exclusive context for sexual intimacy, and the procreative blessing associated with it, finds a rational foundation in Budziszewski’s natural law deductions. His framework thus serves as a potent apologetic, demonstrating that the Biblical understanding of sexuality is not a set of arbitrary prohibitions but rather a reflection of the deepest truths embedded in human nature by its Creator.

    In conclusion, J. Budziszewski’s approach to natural theology in On the Meaning of Sex provides an exceptionally valuable framework for understanding sexuality and gender. By firmly grounding his arguments in the inherent design and purpose of human nature, he navigates complex ethical terrain with clarity and precision. His articulation of sex’s natural meanings—procreation and union—is not only philosophically robust but also demonstrably converges with the ethical insights found in Biblical teachings. In a world often characterized by confusion and suffering regarding sexual identity and behavior, Budziszewski’s work offers a compelling and coherent pathway to rediscovering meaning, leading ultimately to a fuller appreciation of sexuality and gender as they are divinely designed and revealed.

    Works Cited

    Budziszewski, J. On the Meaning of Sex. InterVarsity Press, 2012.The New American Standard Bible, 1995.

  • The Pagan Can Be Saved?

    The Pagan Can Be Saved?

    Wesley Coleman

    In Søren Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, Johannes Climacus breaks down notions, based on objective and speculative interpretations, of Christianity, arguing instead that authentic religious truth is fundamentally subjective. As exemplified in his assertion on page 201 regarding truth in prayer, Climacus posits that the manner of an individual’s infinite, passionate relation to the eternal—even in the face of objective uncertainty or perceived untruth—is paramount, superseding intellectual assent to dogma or historical fact and revealing the inherent limitations of any detached, disinterested approach to faith. This stance foregrounds the lived reality of faith as a personal, strenuous endeavor, fundamentally separate from and perhaps at odds with objective inquiry.

    Kierkegaard, through Climacus, opens the Postscript by challenging what he identifies as problematic approaches to understanding Christianity: the historical, the speculative, and the superficial religiousness prevalent in his time. From the very start, Kierkegaard has separated the objective issue of the truth of Christianity from the subjective issue of the subjective individual’s relation to the truth of Christianity (Kierkegaard 22). Climacus contends that the objective point of view, whether focusing on historical or philosophical truth, is inherently flawed when applied to Christianity. An objective inquiry is characterized as “disinterested,” seeking to establish truth through critical consideration of reports or the relation of doctrine to eternal truth. However, for an individual concerned with their eternal happiness, historical certainty, being merely an “approximation,” is profoundly insufficient. This is because “an approximation is too little to build his happiness on and is so unlike an eternal happiness that no result can ensue” (Kierkegaard 22). The scholarly pursuit, while commendable in its erudition, ultimately “distracts” from the issue of an individual’s faith (Kierkegaard 14) and “suppresses” the vital dialectical clarity required for true understanding (Kierkegaard 11).

    The fundamental problem with objectivity, as Climacus elaborates, is its inherent detachment from the individual’s existence. The “objective subject” is too “modest” and “immodest” to include himself in the inquiry; he is interested but “not infinitely, personally, impassionedly interested in his relation to this truth concerning his own eternal happiness” (Kierkegaard 22). This detachment leads to a comical self-deception: “Precisely this is the basis of the scholar’s elevated calm and the parroter’s comical thoughtlessness” (Kierkegaard 22). Christianity, Climacus asserts, is spirit; spirit is inwardness; inwardness is subjectivity; subjectivity is essentially passion, and at its maximum an infinite, personally interested passion for one’s eternal happiness. Therefore, as soon as subjectivity is taken away, and passion from subjectivity, and infinite interest from passion, there is no decision whatsoever. The objective approach, by sacrificing this infinite, personal, impassioned interestedness, paradoxically makes one too objective to have eternal happiness. The speculative point of view fares no better, attempting to permeate Christianity with thought and and make it eternal thought. Yet, if Christianity is truly subjectivity, a matter of inward deepening, then objective indifference cannot come to know anything whatsoever. Like is understood only by like; thus, the knower must be in the requisite state of infinite, passionate interest. Speculative thought, in its objectivity, is “totally indifferent to his and my and your eternal happiness” (Kierkegaard 55), making its “happiness” an illusion as it attempts to be “exclusively eternal within time” (Kierkegaard 56).

    This critique of objective and speculative approaches, which Climacus gradually unfolds finally builds to a climax on page 201 with the passage at hand to be dealt with. The chapter titled “Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth Is Subjectivity” in Part Two directly introduces the core concept that “truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to immerse oneself, existing, in subjectivity” (Kierkegaard 192). Climacus establishes that for an existing person, “the question about truth persists” not as an abstract definition, but as something to “exist in” (Kierkegaard 191). He dismisses mediation and the abstract “subject-object” as reverting to abstraction (Kierkegaard 192), emphasizing that “an existing person cannot be in two places at the same time, cannot be subject-object” (Kierkegaard 199). The “I-I” is explicitly called a “mathematical point that does not exist at all” (Kierkegaard 197), making it clear, for Climacus, that it is an impossibility for an existing human being to transcend their individual, passionate existence and achieve this abstract oneness. For Climacus, “only ethical and ethical-religious knowing is essential knowing” (Kierkegaard 198), and such knowing is always essentially related to the knower’s own existence.

    The critical distinction, immediately preceding the paragraph in question, is articulated as: “When the question about truth is asked objectively, truth is reflected upon objectively as an object to which the knower relates himself…When the question about truth is asked subjectively, the individual’s relation is reflected upon subjectively. If only the how of this relation is in truth, the individual is in truth, even if he in this way were to relate himself to untruth” (Kierkegaard 199). This prioritizes the mode of relation over the object of relation in its abstracted form separate from engagement.

    Then, the force of Climacus’s argument is finally catalyzed. He starts with an aggressive remark, “now, if the problem is to calculate where there is more truth…then there can be no doubt about the answer for anyone who is not totally botched by scholarship and science” (Kierkegaard 201). The harsh remark is true, it is intuitive for all those not steeped in abstraction. Those who are incapable of grasping the truth are those which have been immersed in a harmful way of thinking, and Climacus’s words are meant to provoke that truth. The phrase “botched by scholarship and science” in particular is reminiscent of the “infinite, personal, impassioned interestedness” which exists in the person practicing the objective issue (Kierkegaard 27).

    Climacus then explicitly rules out any notion of a neutral, balanced approach: “(and, as stated, simultaneously to be on both sides equally is not granted to an existing person but is only a beatifying delusion for a deluded I-I)” (Kierkegaard 201). This re-emphasizes that an existing human being cannot inhabit the abstract “subject-object” or “I-I,” which is a phantom of pure thought (Kierkegaard 192). To attempt such a mediation between objective and subjective approaches is a “delusion,” a fantastical escape from the concrete reality of existing. An existing person is always in a process of becoming (Kierkegaard 192), and this inherent motion precludes the static, all-encompassing view of the “I-I” (Kierkegaard 199).

    The core of the paragraph is the deep dichotomy presented: “whether on the side of the person who only objectively seeks the true God and the approximating truth of the God-idea or on the side of the person who is infinitely concerned that he in truth relate himself to God with the infinite passion of need” (Kierkegaard 201). The dichotomy is on one hand, “the true God” and “approximating truth of the God-idea” and on the other, “infinite passion of need.” The objective seeker remains stuck in approximate knowledge, which, as established earlier, is insufficient for eternal happiness. In contrast, the “infinite passion of need” signifies the highest subjectivity, where the individual’s “eternal happiness” is at stake. This passion brings true existential importance to the individual which is impossible through speculation.

    The paragraph then presents a provocative thought experiment: “If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of the true idea of God, the house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but prays in untruth, and if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the passion of infinity, although his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol—where, then, is there more truth?” (Kierkegaard 201). This scenario is incredibly hard for many who view Christianity as something true that one believes about God. This analogy turns that presumption on its head drawing a distinction between the “what” and the “how” of faith (Kierkegaard 199). The person who is a Christian by birth or culture or even intellectually “knows the true idea of God” and prays in the “house of the true God” (Kierkegaard 201) represents the objective approach that assumes faith is an afterthought and something that can be taken for granted. Such an individual may possess all the outward forms and correct doctrines, but their prayer is “in untruth” if it lacks the “infinite passion of inwardness” (Kierkegaard 201). This coincides with Climacus’s earlier assertion that objective Christianity is pagan (Kierkegaard 43), and to know a creed by rote is paganism, because Christianity is inwardness. Their knowledge, being disinterested, is merely a vanishing, unrecognizable atom of objective understanding, not transformative truth.

    Conversely, the individual in an “idolatrous land” who prays “with all the passion of infinity” to an idol, despite the objective untruth of the object, possesses “more truth” (Kierkegaard 201). The passion itself, the subjective “how” of their relation, is the determining factor. This is because the passion of the infinite is the very truth. Their worship, even of an objectively false god, carries the weight of authentic, boundless engagement.

    The conclusion of the paragraph drives the point home: “The one prays in truth to God although he is worshiping an idol; the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in truth worshiping an idol” (Kierkegaard 201). This is not a relativistic dismissal of God’s objective existence, but a radical redefinition of what constitutes truth in the context of an individual’s religious life. The person who prays passionately to an idol is, in their inwardness, genuinely seeking the divine, and this “infinite passion of need” (Kierkegaard 201) creates a true “God-relation” (Kierkegaard 199). Their relation, despite the objective error, is in truth. This is, perhaps, a shocking revelation to the one who calls the heretic ‘unsaved’. Conversely, the person who prays to the true God without this infinite passion effectively turns the true God into an “idol”—an object of detached, intellectual assent rather than a living, transforming presence. This intellectual understanding without passionate inwardness is merely an illusion. It reduces the divine to an object for intellectual scrutiny, precisely what objective thought does to Christianity (Kierkegaard 52).

    Other possible interpretations of this passage, primarily objective or speculative, fail to grasp its radical thrust. An objective interpretation would likely focus on the factual untruth of idol worship, concluding that the idolater is in untruth regardless of their passion. This perspective, however, completely misses Climacus’s central argument that objective knowledge is “indifferent” to the knower’s existence and thus cannot engage with the truth of the infinite (Kierkegaard 193). For an objective approach, the truth is merely “an object to which the knower relates himself” (Kierkegaard 199), failing to recognize that “the individual’s relation is reflected upon subjectively” and the “how” is truth (Kierkegaard 199). This kind of detached, “disinterested” knowledge simply “distracts” from the issue of faith (Kierkegaard 28).

    A speculative interpretation might attempt to mediate between the two positions, arguing that the true understanding lies in a higher synthesis where both the object and the subjective relation are reconciled. However, Climacus explicitly rejects such mediation for an existing person, stating that to be in mediation is to be finished; to exist is to become. Speculative thought, in its quest for a “system” (Kierkegaard 14), “promises everything and keeps nothing at all” for the existing individual. It assumes a “presuppositionless” beginning and ultimately “dissolves into a make-believe” of understanding faith (Kierkegaard 14). By attempting to “explain and annul” the paradox, speculative thought implicitly “corrects” Christianity instead of explaining it. The absolute paradox, which is the eternal truth coming into existence in time, cannot be understood but only believed “against the understanding” (Kierkegaard 217). Any attempt to rationally encompass or explain it is “volatilization” and a return to paganism (Kierkegaard 217). The speculative thinker, in trying to become “objective” and “disappear from himself” (Kierkegaard 56), cannot grasp the existential truth of faith, which is grounded in passion and the “utmost exertion” of the existing self (Kierkegaard 55).

    Furthermore, the interpretation that reduces Christianity to a set of doctrines or a historical phenomenon, implicitly adopted by the “Christian in the midst of Christianity” who prays “in untruth” (Kierkegaard 201), is also rejected. Christianity is not a doctrine but a relational act. The relation to a doctrine is merely intellectual, whereas the relation to Christianity is one of faith, an infinite interestedness. To be a Christian by name only is a serious danger due to the fact that it removes the necessary “infinite passion” (Kierkegaard 16). Such individuals, by “praying in untruth” (Kierkegaard 201), effectively transform the true God into an “idol” (Kierkegaard 201), stripped of the demanding, transformative power that calls for infinite inwardness.

    In conclusion, the paragraph on page 201 profoundly encapsulates Climacus’s core thesis: Christianity’s truth is existentially actualized not through objective knowledge or speculative comprehension, but through the subjective individual’s absolute, infinite passion. This passion, born of an “infinite need” and held fast against “objective uncertainty” (Kierkegaard 203), is the very essence of faith, a “contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and the objective uncertainty” (Kierkegaard 204). The example of the passionate idolater versus the dispassionate Christian reveals that the intensity and truthfulness of the subjective relation far outweighs the objective accuracy of the object of worship when it comes to genuine religiousness. This radical emphasis on the “how” of faith over the “what” forces the reader to confront the demanding, terrifying, and deeply personal nature of becoming and being a Christian, a path that rejects the easy and fragmentary reassurances of objective certainty and speculative systems in favor of a lived, passionate existence with a holistic commitment. The radical conclusion that one can have objective error and be in real relationship with God. The radical conclusion that the pagan can be saved. Not because their idol is the true God, but because they have true faith.

    Climacus, Johannes. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton UP, 1992.

  • The Creation, the Fall, and the Problem of Suffering

    The Creation, the Fall, and the Problem of Suffering

    The problem of evil, death, and suffering has plagued humanity for millennia. How can a loving, all-powerful God allow such things? Many Christians have proposed scenarios suggesting that suffering helps us truly value goodness, or that our need for redemption demonstrates God’s great love. However, these explanations often fall short. Wouldn’t it be better to never experience sickness at all? And what about animal suffering, like a doe trapped in a forest fire?

    These challenging questions have a clear biblical explanation that is often overlooked when Christians disregard the evidence for a young creation perspective. From a biblical creationist viewpoint, the answers to suffering and death lie in three key areas:

    • The original perfect creation
    • The exercise of human free will
    • God’s righteous judgment following sin

    Genesis 1:31 states that God declared His creation “very good.” This description implies a state of perfection—a world without the decay and suffering we see today. This perfect state is fundamentally incompatible with the presence of death, disease, and suffering as original features of creation.

    The pivotal moment occurs in Genesis 2:17, where God warns Adam: “but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die.”

    The Hebrew text provides important insights:

    • Young’s Literal Translation renders “you shall surely die” as “dying thou dost die,” capturing the Hebrew infinitive absolute that emphasizes both the certainty and the process of death
    • The Hebrew word “בְּי֛וֹם” (be-yohm, “in the day”) with its prefix typically refers to an age or time period, indicating the consequences would begin in the age they ate the fruit, not necessarily instantaneously

    When Adam and Eve disobeyed, God’s judgment was pronounced in Genesis 3:19: “By the sweat of your face you shall eat bread, till you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; for you are dust, and to dust you shall return.” This confirmed that physical death entered the world, alongside the spiritual death that had already occurred at the moment of disobedience.

    The Bible clearly states that both humans and animals were originally vegetarian:

    “And God said, ‘Behold, I have given you every plant yielding seed that is on the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit. You shall have them for food. And to every beast of the earth and to every bird of the heavens and to everything that creeps on the earth, everything that has the breath of life, I have given every green plant for food.’ And it was so.” (Genesis 1:29-30)

    This passage reveals a world initially free from predation and animal suffering before the Fall.

    An important distinction exists between plant life and animal life. After the Flood, God permitted humans to eat animal flesh: “Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you. And as I gave you the green plants, I give you everything. But you shall not eat flesh with its life, that is, its blood” (Genesis 9:3-4).

    The Hebrew term “nephesh chayyah” (living soul) applies to animals and humans, but not to plants, indicating a significant difference in the biblical concept of “life.” This distinction explains why the consumption of plants does not constitute death in the same sense as animal or human death.

    The ability to choose between good and evil is fundamental to human nature and dignity. Adam and Eve’s decision to disobey God was a deliberate exercise of free will with profound consequences. This choice introduced sin, death, and suffering into the world, demonstrating the reality and weight of moral responsibility.

    God valued human freedom enough to allow the possibility of wrong choices, even knowing the devastating consequences that would follow. This perspective highlights both God’s respect for human agency and the seriousness with which He views our moral decisions.

    The biblical creation account directly contradicts the evolutionary narrative, which posits death and competition as essential drivers of biological change. The biblical view presents:

    • A “very good” original creation
    • The introduction of death after the Fall
    • A fundamentally different understanding of Earth’s history

    If death existed before Adam’s sin, this would undermine the biblical connection between sin and death, and by extension, the necessity of Christ’s sacrificial death to overcome sin.

    The biblical account clearly states that death entered the world through Adam’s sin. 1 Corinthians 15:21-22, “For as by a man came death, by a man has come also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive.”  

    Conclusion

    The creation account, coupled with the concepts of free will and God’s judgment, provides a comprehensive explanation for the presence of evil, death, and suffering in our world. While these issues remain complex and deeply personal, the biblical narrative offers a framework for understanding them within the context of:

    • God’s original perfect creation
    • Humanity’s fall into sin
    • God’s redemptive plan

    By embracing the creationist perspective, we gain a deeper appreciation for the profound implications of the Fall and the hope offered through God’s promise of restoration. Rather than attempting to reconcile death and suffering as part of God’s original “very good” creation, we recognize them as intruders in a once-perfect world—intruders that will ultimately be defeated through Christ’s redemptive work.

  • Ologies,ologies, everywhere, Nor any drop to drink…

    Ologies,ologies, everywhere, Nor any drop to drink…

    So, you’re telling me that every field of study, from the submicroscopic quarks of quantum physics to the grand cosmic spirals of astrophysics, can’t help but stumble over the God question? Metaphysics? Yes. Phenomenology? Check. Cosmology? Double-check. Epistemology? What do you know! Even dear old biology, with all its little proteins and DNA, can’t resist a good teleological head-scratcher.

    Now, I’m not saying this proves anything. I’m just saying, if you walk into a library and every book has a page on Bigfoot, you might start to wonder if there’s really something to that hairy fellow lurking in the woods. And when every intellectual pursuit is pondering about the divine, maybe, just maybe, He’s not a mere figment of our collective imagination.

    In an interview on the Soul Boom podcast, the well-known agnostic skeptic Alex O’Connor was asked what the best argument for the existence of God was. He said, “There are so many, I think there’s even an argument for the existence of God that can be made just from the number of arguments for the existence of God. The fact that there’s an argument from beauty, and argument from contingency, from ontology, from maths… Anywhere you look, there’s an argument for God, so you could always make an argument for God’s existence from the sheer number of arguments for God’s existence.”

    So in your honour, Alex, here is a little syllogism (albeit tongue and cheek):

    Let’s get logical for a second:

    1. Premise 1: Multiple independent disciplines (across diverse “ologies”) converge on arguments that point to or require a transcendent foundation resembling theistic conceptions.
    2. Premise 2: When independent intellectual traditions across diverse cultures and disciplines converge on similar conclusions despite different methodologies and starting assumptions, this convergence provides strong evidence for the validity of those conclusions.
    3. Premise 3: This convergence pattern exists regarding arguments that point to a transcendent foundation for reality, knowledge, consciousness, morality, etc.
    4. Conclusion: Therefore, there is strong evidence for the validity of a transcendent foundation (resembling theistic conceptions) for reality.

    Boom. Check mate, atheists.

    Of course, the skeptics will say, “But correlation doesn’t equal causation!” And to that, I say, “Sure, but it’s a heck of a coincidence, isn’t it?” It’s like finding a universal remote that works on every TV in the world. You might start to suspect someone is behind all these converging coincidences.

    The Information Age and the Divine Download

    Think about it: information theory tells us that complex information requires an intelligent source. Biological systems scream design, the fine-tuning of the universe is downright suspicious, and even our own brains’ consciousness hint at something beyond the purely material. As Dr. Stephen C. Meyer argues in his book “Signature in the Cell“, the digital code within DNA points to an intelligent cause.

    And if our brains can conjure up these elaborate arguments for God, maybe, just maybe, they’re picking up a signal from the ultimate source code. A divine download, if you will.

    A Gentle Nudge

    Maybe this is what Blaise Pascal thinking when he made his wager? We all must make a choice about believing in God’s existence or not with incomplete information, and the potential gains for accepting Him far outweigh the negatives. Perhaps the next time you’re investigating an obscure ‘ology’, and you find yourself pondering the God question, remember: in the end it comes down to a subjective decision. And the universe, in all its vastness and complexity, seems to be whispering which path to choose.

    Now, I’m not saying you have to believe any of this. But maybe, just maybe, it’s worth a second thought?

    Video: “Alex O’Connor Explores the Mysteries of God | Soul Boom” Soul Boom w/ Rainn Wilson (2025)

  • Presuppositionalism: A Tool for Christian Apologetics?

    Presuppositionalism: A Tool for Christian Apologetics?

    In the landscape of Christian apologetics, presuppositional apologetics presents a distinctive approach to understanding knowledge, reality, and belief. This philosophical method, pioneered by thinkers like Cornelius Van Til in the 1920s, challenges fundamental assumptions about epistemology and seeks to demonstrate the unique explanatory power of a biblical worldview.

    Understanding Presuppositionalism

    Presuppositional apologetics advances a bold claim: Christian theism provides the only coherent framework for understanding logic, morality, and the nature of knowledge itself. Unlike classical apologetic approaches that seek to prove God’s existence through external evidence, this method argues that the very possibility of rational thought depends on acknowledging a divine foundation.

    The core principle is that every individual, consciously or unconsciously, operates from a set of foundational beliefs about reality. These presuppositions shape how we interpret evidence, understand causality, and construct meaning. Presuppositionalists argue that a naturalistic worldview ultimately fails to provide a stable ground for rational inquiry.

    The Philosophical Challenge of Solipsism

    At the heart of this approach lies a profound philosophical challenge: the problem of solipsism. If we cannot definitively prove the existence of anything beyond our own mind, how can we claim to know anything with certainty? This epistemological dilemma threatens to reduce all knowledge to a subjective, potentially illusory experience.

    Traditional empiricist approaches, as critiqued by philosophers like David Hume, struggle to overcome this fundamental uncertainty. Empiricism, which relies solely on sensory experience and observation, cannot conclusively escape the possibility that our perceptions are merely internal constructs with no correspondence to an external reality.

    The Divine Foundation of Knowledge

    The presuppositional argument proposes a radical solution: God’s existence as the transcendent Creator provides the necessary foundation for objective knowledge. This perspective argues that:

    1. An objective reality exists independent of human perception
    2. Universal principles of logic and morality are grounded in God’s unchanging nature
    3. Human reasoning gains its validity from a divine source of rationality

    By positioning God as the ultimate source of knowledge, this approach attempts to resolve the solipsistic dilemma. The created world, according to this view, is not a mental construct but a real, intentionally designed system that reflects divine intelligence.

    Scientific and Philosophical Implications

    While traditional creation science is often criticized, presuppositional apologetics seeks to integrate philosophical reasoning with scientific inquiry. Concepts like baraminology (the study of created kinds) and catastrophic plate tectonics are presented as attempts to provide alternative explanatory frameworks for natural phenomena.

    However, it is crucial to recognize that these arguments remain contentious within the broader scientific community. The strength of the presuppositional approach lies not in its empirical evidence but in its philosophical critique of naturalistic epistemology.

    Critiques and Limitations

    The presuppositional method is not without significant challenges:

    1. It can appear circular, assuming the very thing it seeks to prove
    2. It may not convincingly engage with those who do not share its initial theological premises
    3. It risks oversimplifying complex philosophical and scientific questions

    Despite these limitations, the approach offers a provocative challenge to purely materialistic worldviews, forcing a deeper examination of the foundations of knowledge.

    Conclusion

    Presuppositional apologetics represents a sophisticated attempt to ground human understanding in a transcendent perspective. By challenging the foundations of knowledge and highlighting the limitations of naturalistic epistemology, it invites a more nuanced conversation about the nature of reality, reason, and belief.

    While not universally convincing, this approach provides a thought-provoking framework for those seeking to understand the relationship between faith, philosophy, and scientific inquiry.

  • The Paradox of Free Will

    The Paradox of Free Will

    The question of free will has perplexed theologians and philosophers for centuries. For one concerned with a proper exegesis of the Bible, the concept of free will is crucial for understanding human responsibility, divine justice, and the nature of God’s relationship with humanity.

    The Bible consistently presents humans as moral agents capable of making choices. Several passages highlight this:  

    • Deuteronomy 30:19: “I call heaven and earth to witness against you today, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that you and your offspring may live.”
    • Joshua 24:15: “And if it is evil in your eyes to serve the Lord, choose this day whom you will serve, whether the gods your fathers served in the region beyond the River, or the gods of the Amorites in whose land you dwell. But as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord.”
    • Revelation 3:20: “Behold, I stand at the door and knock. If anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come in to him and eat with him, and he with me.”
    • 2 Peter 3:9: “The Lord is not slow to fulfill his promise as some count slowness, but is patient toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance.”

    These verses establish that God has instilled in his image-bearing creation an ability to make moral choices. God has made these choices available to us and we are culpable for our sin in disobedience. This is, at the very least, a strong indication that mankind is accountable to God. Therefore, ruling out any form of determinism that denies human accountability.

    Theological Considerations

    The tension between God’s sovereignty and human free will is a central theological challenge. There is not a simple yes or no that we can give to the question of free will, because it exists in the particular. While God is omniscient and omnipotent, the Bible also affirms human accountability. Further, God can intercede in human activity, even moral activity.

    A common example of this is God’s hardening of the Pharaoh’s heart in Exodus. God foreknew Pharaoh’s hardened heart, but Pharaoh’s initial choices were what led to divine hardening. God’s foreknowledge does not negate Pharaoh’s agency. This is what’s called prescience. God knowing the future, but did not cause the future.

    God is in total control of how he behaves and interacts with his creation. That does not mean he has to necessarily micromanage every aspect such that this world then becomes, “the greatest of all possible worlds.” If you take the view that God plays a direct role in every particular, you will run into a few problems.

    Take the popular analogy of God as an author and humans as characters. This is often used to argue against free will. It goes like this: imagine all of humankind and the universe, itself, are figures of the imagination of God. Sure, in the narrative a certain character may act in this or that way based on their motivations and choices, yet these motivations and choices were all designed by the author. The author can write the characters in whatever way is pleasing.

    However, this analogy breaks down when considering God’s desire for genuine relationship. This view results in the rather absurd conclusion that God must have created us solely for the entertainment value. If humans are merely puppets, their love for God is not authentic. True love requires reciprocal choice which requires free will. Therefore, a world without free will results in a parasitic phantasy in the mind of God.

    There are two counters to this perspective that I encounter often. They have to do with the power of God and the will of God. I will address, first, the will of God.

    It is indeed the case that nothing can happen apart from God’s will. So when this criticism gets brought up the framing is such that it appears, therefore, God wills for all the choices which you have made in your life to have happened and in the manner in which they happened. However, there is a hidden assumption. Does God actually will that, or is what God values a more nuances proposition. I argue that God’s will can be to permit free agency. This is suggested heavily in scripture any time that God calls for a response from his creation. When God says “sin no more,” he is calling man to action. Why is it necessary for God to say this, if God is the only active agent in the process of who sins and who does not? Does it make sense for me to say to my bicycle, “stop pedaling.” According to some, it is not the bike doing the pedaling and, likewise, it is not the man doing the sinning (although the bike is moving and the man is acting they are not casually powerful).

    So does man having free will to choose actions that move away from God’s set path make God less powerful? This claim is often made against those who endorse a free-will-agency view. It is suggested that, if man can act apart from God’s purpose for their life (even if it’s not against God’s will) there still arises a problem in which God could plausibly create a world where every freewill agent he created would freely choose him. God can rig the game in his favor, so to speak. Apart from the fact that if this counterexample is true, it has graver consequence on the validity of a reformed view, there is a logical error in this understanding of the nature of free will.

    If God were to guarantee a specific outcome, such as every human freely choosing him, then the choice would no longer be truly free. It would be a predetermined response, a mere illusion of choice. True free will necessitates the genuine possibility of choosing otherwise, including the potential for rejection. To remove this possibility is to remove the essence of free will itself, rendering it meaningless. Therefore, to argue that God’s power is diminished by allowing genuine free will is to misunderstand that genuine free will requires the possibility of choosing against God.

    Three Main Arguments For Free Will:

    1. If God ordains every human action, including evil ones, then God becomes the author of evil. For the young earth creationist there is a clear perspective which attributes evil to the misuse of free will, consistent with the Genesis narrative of the Fall. God allows evil, but he does not create it.
    2. As Dr. Michael S. Heiser argues, humans are created in God’s image, which includes attributes like intelligence, emotion, and creativity. It is consistent that free will is also a component of this image. To deny free will is to diminish human dignity and responsibility. It is also rather arbitrary to leave out a significant part of man’s God-image for no apparent reason. 
    3. The sacrifice of Jesus Christ is presented as sufficient for all humanity. If salvation is not universally applied, it is due to individual rejection, not divine limitation. God’s desire that none shall perish, is a strong argument for free will.

    Conclusion

    In conclusion, the biblical narrative, particularly the passages emphasizing human choice and accountability, strongly supports the concept of free will. While the tension between divine sovereignty and human agency presents a complex theological challenge, the young-Earth creationist perspective offers a coherent framework for understanding this relationship. By recognizing God’s permissive will, acknowledging the importance of genuine relationship, and affirming the image of God in humanity, we can reconcile these seemingly contradictory truths. The rejection of a deterministic worldview, which reduces humans to mere puppets, underscores the significance of free will in the context of divine justice and love. Potentially, the concept of created heterozygosity and information theory can provide a scientific framework and biological basis for understanding the inherent capacity for diverse moral choices within the created order (although this is speculation). Ultimately, the existence of free will, while a mystery in some respects, is essential for understanding human responsibility, the nature of God’s relationship with humanity, and the very essence of love itself.

  • A Personal Reflection on Kierkegaard’s “Leap” of Faith

    A Personal Reflection on Kierkegaard’s “Leap” of Faith

    Reading Kierkegaard’s “Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” particularly his exploration of the “leap” of faith, resonates deeply with my own understanding of what it means to embrace a Christian worldview. It’s not merely about intellectual assent to historical or scientific propositions; it’s a profound, personal relationship that transcends the limitations of objective knowledge.

    Kierkegaard, through Climacus, articulates the “leap” as a radical discontinuity, a “shifting from one genus to another.” This echoes my own experience in realizing that, although science is fascinating, it is not what we’ll get our final grade on. Just as Climacus argues that historical facts, no matter how compelling, cannot generate faith, I’ve found that scientific evidence, while supportive, doesn’t compel belief on its own. Faith is not a matter of knowing the truth or knowing anything–it’s a leap. This leap is a move from the objective to the subjective, from the realm of empirical observation to the domain of personal commitment.

    The “ugly broad ditch” metaphor, about the unbridgeable gap between objective and subjective (relational, personal, i.e., of the subject) truth, illustrates the seemingly insurmountable divide between rational inquiry and the act of faith. No amount of scientific evidence or logical argumentation can bridge this gap. The leap is not a gradual progression but a decisive moment, a qualitative shift that defies rational calculation. It’s not about accumulating evidence until the scale tips; it’s about recognizing the inherent limitations of objective knowledge and choosing to embrace a truth that transcends it.

    Climacus’s critique of “earnestness” is particularly helpful. He argues that intellectual striving is “droll enough” in the context of the leap. I’ve encountered many who seek to intellectualize faith, to reduce it to a system of logical propositions. But faith, as Kierkegaard understands it, is not a product of intellectual prowess. It’s a matter of the will, a subjective commitment that transcends the realm of reason. One cannot “earnestly” approach faith; one either makes the leap or one does not. Yet, that is not to undermine neither the objective world nor the subjective relationship.

    Climacus’ satirical jab at those who attempt to “grab oneself by the neck a la Münchhausen” (a fictional character known for pulling himself out of a swamp by his own hair) speaks to the absurdity of trying to force faith through intellectual gymnastics. It’s a warning against self-deception, against pretending to have made the leap without truly engaging with its radical, personal nature. This resonates with a perspective which acknowledges the limitations of scientific and theological models and the necessity of a personal encounter with the Creator.

    You often here the accusation so and so has “blind faith” or that faith is not based on evidence. For me, the leap of faith is not a blind leap into irrationality. It’s a recognition that objective knowledge, while valuable, is insufficient to grasp the fullness of reality. It’s an acknowledgment that there are truths that transcend empirical observation, truths that can only be apprehended through a subjective act of commitment. In the context of creationism, the leap involves acknowledging the limitations of naturalistic explanations and embracing the possibility of a Creator whose handiwork is evident in the complexity and beauty of the natural world.

    This is valuable because we often feel the pressure to demonstrate the historical or the scientific aspect of our worldview as firmly in the historical or scientific. It is not. It is more. It is a leap into a new genus (Aristotelian category) of reality. It is a new domain of experience in addition to and separate from what we experience in religion, science, and the day-to-day.

    The leap is a deeply personal decision, one that each individual must make for themselves. It’s a journey that involves wrestling with doubt, questioning assumptions, and ultimately choosing to embrace a truth that resonates with the deepest parts of one’s being. It’s a move from stranglehold the “objective” has on our society into a complementary view which includes the “subjective”, a move that is essential for true faith.

    Citation

    1. Kierkegaard, Søren. Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments. Edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton University Press, 1992.
  • My Top 5 Favorite Creation Podcasts

    My Top 5 Favorite Creation Podcasts

    As a creation enthusiast, I’m always on the lookout for resources that delve into the fascinating intersection of science and the biblical narrative. Podcasts have become a fantastic avenue for exploring these topics in depth, and I’ve curated a list of my top five favorites that consistently deliver insightful and engaging content.

    1. Let’s Talk Creation:

    This podcast is a gem for anyone seeking thoughtful and accessible discussions on creation science. Hosted by two PhD creationists, Todd Wood (baraminology) and Paul Garner (geology), “Let’s Talk Creation” offers bimonthly episodes that are both informative and easy to digest. What I appreciate most is their level-headed approach and their ability to break down complex scientific concepts into understandable terms. You’ll walk away from each episode with new insights and a deeper appreciation for the creation model.

    2. Standing For Truth:

    “Standing For Truth” is a powerhouse of creation content. With a vast database of interviews featuring subject experts from every relevant field, this podcast provides a comprehensive exploration of creation science. While it can get a little technical at times, the in-depth discussions and expert perspectives make it a valuable resource for those seeking a more rigorous understanding of the evidence.

    3. Creation Ministries International:

    For high-quality production and a wide variety of topics, “Creation Ministries International” delivers. Their videos are visually engaging and provide digestible explanations of creation science concepts including a wide range of scientists, philosophers, and theologians. While they may not always delve into the deepest technical details, their content is perfect for those seeking a solid overview of the evidence and its implications.

    4. Creation Unfolding:

    If you’re particularly interested in geology and paleontology, “Creation Unfolding” is a must-listen. The main host, Dr. K. P. Coulson, a well-researched geologist, brings a wealth of knowledge to the table, and the recurring guests provide diverse perspectives on these fascinating subjects. The laser-focused approach of this podcast makes it an invaluable resource for those seeking a deeper understanding of Earth’s history from a creationist perspective.

    5. Biblical Genetics:

    Dr. Robert Carter’s personal podcast, “Biblical Genetics,” is a treasure trove of information for anyone interested in the intersection of genetics and creation science. Dr. Carter, a renowned geneticist, tackles complex topics with clarity and precision, responding to popular-level content creators and professors with detailed explanations and analysis of technical papers. He skillfully guides listeners through intricate genetic concepts, making them accessible to a wider audience.

    These five podcasts represent a diverse range of perspectives and approaches to creation science. Whether you’re a seasoned creationist or just beginning to explore these topics, you’re sure to find valuable insights and engaging discussions within these podcasts.