Creation Questions

Tag: Epistemology

  • The Five Major Challenges To Hume’s Skepticism

    The Five Major Challenges To Hume’s Skepticism

    In David Hume’s book A Treatise of Human Nature, he constructs what he calls the science of man. One cannot rightly understand any other species of science before this foundational science. The most radical and paradigm-shifting realization, for Hume, is that if all that exists are impressions and ideas, there are no grounds to truly justify putting any two impressions together causally, no matter how we might be inclined or disposed to do so, either by vulgar habit or through any rational means. This profound insight — that impressions are singular moments of a particular feeling with no relation except that of imagination — forced philosophers (including critics such as Reid) to deeply re-evaluate theories of knowledge acquisition and general epistemic concerns.

    Reid says this in his dedication for An Inquiry into the Human Mind, “His reasoning appeared to me to be just: there was therefore a necessity to call in question the principles upon which it was founded, or to admit the conclusions.” However, there are more reasons than the mere founding principles to reject Hume’s rationale. Drawing on a recent and rigorous debate, here are the five major critiques that make me skeptical of Hume’s skeptical conclusions.

    1. Circular Reasoning (The Problem of Induction)

    Hume uses causal reasoning (observing past regularities and inferring principles about human nature) to undermine the rational basis of causal reasoning. Suppose Hume justifies the separation of cause and correlation from experience, and he uses the distinction to describe and also argue against cause-and-effect as existing outside the mind (outside a relation/idea). In that case, he is making a circular argument. The implications of this circular reasoning are profound, as it challenges the very basis of our understanding of cause and effect. If belief in necessary connection is understood apart from reason, then there is equally no reason to undermine causal reasoning. The basis for an essential connection is reason and logical deduction. Thus, we can infer it from particular impressions, or it is not, and thus we can infer it based on specific impressions. Nothing falls on his skeptical rebuttal. You cannot easily conceive of a cause without an effect, any more than a premise without a conclusion.

    2. The Self-Refutation of Assertion and Communication

    The fact that Hume is making an argument refutes his point entirely. On what grounds can Hume either 1. make a distinction between kinds of necessity or 2. place either relations or matters of fact squarely into one category? Unthinkable things are equivalent to non-existent things, according to Hume. Therefore, you cannot make claims about external reality with reference to non-existent concepts. Even concepts of the imagination must exist by virtue of real impressions that have newly associated connections. Where are the impressions for a law such as non-contradiction?

    Hume believes we cannot know a table exists, so this is not simply descriptive. His outward attempts to convince others, and the fact that he has followers who support his theory, testify against him. Psychological interpretations of reality are false simply because meaning exists apart from the mechanical goings-on of the mind, and that meaning is communicable. The very fact that Hume is articulating his theory indicates such. Even a phenomenological view is better than psychologism.

    3. The Ad Hoc Assumption of External Existence

    Hume asks for the impression that gives rise to the idea of continuation and external existence separate from our perception, but where does he get the idea of continuation and external existence in the first place? If everything is sense impressions, how is he arguing against anything contrary to sense impressions? This is all very ad hoc. Calling concepts fabrications of the imagination and such. Does he not realize that by doing so, he’s condemning his very principles, which allowed him to condemn continuation and external existence?

    4. The Active Nature of Impressions, Not Raw Data

    There is also another popular critique of Hume. That is the notion of the tree falling in the woods. The tree falls without making a sound. A sound is something that can only be heard. The point being, Hume’s impressions already imply cause-and-effect before they are even interpreted or registered. Here is another thing. If two people hear a recording of an orchestra, but one of them has finely tuned ears for orchestration while the other does not, then, on first glance, the one with finely tuned ears will hear the counter-melody played on the violin. The one that does not is not surprising. However, Hume would have to acknowledge this as an impression reflected, interpreted by relation (all of which in a near-instant), yet that implies a higher acuity has been granted to the one in the realm of a particular sense. If sense is raw data, and therefore something that you receive and not create, it stands to reason that you should not be able to improve in the tacit reception of raw data. This analogy highlights the inherent contradictions in Hume’s argument, suggesting that our senses are not passive receptors of information but active interpreters that can improve over time.

    5. The Flawed Equivalence of Conceivability and Possibility

    A rigorous philosophical objection to Hume’s conclusion on necessity centers on his premise that what is conceivable is logically possible. Hume argues that because we can conceive of a cause without its usual effect (e.g., imagining the sun not rising) without contradiction, the necessary connection is not a truth of reason, but of habit. However, this conflates a psychological possibility (what we can imagine) with a metaphysical possibility (what could actually happen in reality). Contemporary critics argue that our inability to conceive of a contradiction in a causal break may reflect our epistemic limitations —our ignorance of deep, non-obvious natural laws —rather than a statement about the world itself. Therefore, the supposed “freedom” of the imagination that underpins his skepticism is merely a function of our ignorance of actual natural necessity, and his argument fails to prove that the necessity is truly absent from the objects themselves.

  • Beyond Naturalism and Towards True Knowledge

    Beyond Naturalism and Towards True Knowledge

    The very definition of science has undergone a subtle yet significant shift. Historically, science was understood as the pursuit of knowledge, a quest to understand the world around us through observation and reason. This pursuit inherently necessitates certain presuppositions: that the universe operates with causal connections, that truth is knowable, and that we can have confidence in our ability to discern it. However, modern science has often become synonymous with methodological naturalism, a philosophy that restricts scientific inquiry to natural causes, excluding any possibility of non-natural or supernatural agency. The RationalWiki page on Methodological Naturalism introduces the concept like so:

    Methodological naturalism is the label for the required assumption of philosophical naturalism when working with the scientific method. Methodological naturalists limit their scientific research to the study of natural causes, because any attempts to define causal relationships with the supernatural are never fruitful, and result in the creation of scientific “dead ends” and God of the gaps-type hypotheses. To avoid these traps, scientists assume that all causes are empirical and naturalistic, which means they can be measured, quantified, and studied methodically.

    However, this assumption of naturalism need not extend beyond an assumption of methodology. This is what separates methodological naturalism from philosophical naturalism — the former is merely a tool and makes no truth claim, while the latter makes the philosophical — essentially atheistic — claim that only natural causes exist.

    The distinction between methodological and ontological naturalism, while often presented as this clear boundary, is, in practice, a strategic rhetorical move. Methodological naturalism purports to be a neutral, non-ontological framework for scientific inquiry. It claims to be a mere rule of engagement—that science should only investigate natural phenomena using natural explanations. Yet, in its application, it inexorably leads to ontological conclusions. By systematically excluding the possibility of non-natural causes a priori, science creates a worldview in which naturalism appears to be the only viable explanation for everything. This isn’t a discovery; it’s a foregone conclusion derived from the very rules of the game.


    The assumptions underpinning science are the most glaring example of this flawed logic. Science demands that phenomena be testable, repeatable, and observable, yet it rests on a foundation of unproven, non-empirical assumptions. We must assume logic, order, and consistency in nature—presuppositions that are not themselves testable by the scientific method. This creates a paradox: science, in its pursuit of knowledge, relies on foundational truths that are, by its own criteria, unscientific.


    This arbitrary limitation is particularly problematic when we consider the concept of agent causation. In fields like forensics, we readily distinguish between natural and volitional causes. We can conclude, based on empirical evidence, that an event was caused by an agent’s intent or will, even though that intent is not a physical object we can measure. There is already a precedent for including non-material causes in our models of reality. Science, as a system for making models that account for data, should be open to all potential causal explanations, not just those that fit within a pre-approved, naturalist box. By artificially fixing its scope to exclude supernatural causes, science pre-determines its own conclusions and, in doing so, sacrifices the pursuit of a more complete truth about reality. It becomes a system for confirming its own biases, rather than an open-ended quest for knowledge.


    Further, this limitation creates a profound epistemological problem. Consider the analogy of a painting: while analyzing the physical components of the paint and canvas can provide valuable information, it does not explain the origin or intent of the artwork. Even if we limit the inquiry to all natural processes and we found how the components could have been put together in this fashion through totally naturalistic processes, that doesn’t mean that this is the only explanation nor the most parsimonious explanation.
    Again forensics, but not just forensics, but archaeology, information theory, search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI), and geography. We routinely investigate both natural and non-natural causes. Embedded within these fields is the idea of agent causation, intentionality, and will. Archaeology examines artifacts to understand the cultural and intellectual agency of past civilizations. Information theory can examine material, in respect to its environment, which is high in free energy. This is usually simply described as complex and specified information. The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) demonstrates that science can test for non-natural causes, such as intelligent signals from distant galaxies. Geography can also seek an understanding of how humans have impacted the natural processes and landforms of their environments through various farming and infrastructure.


    Why, then, is natural science uniquely restricted?


    The claim that science will eventually explain all phenomena through natural processes creates a logical contradiction. Methodological naturalism, by its very nature, cannot detect non-natural causes. Therefore, any conclusions drawn from this limited methodology are inherently incomplete. Scientific methodology is rooted in epistemological assumptions, and flawed assumptions lead to incomplete or inaccurate conclusions. Pragmatism, while useful, is insufficient for pursuing truth if it ignores potential causal factors.


    Counterexamples abound, highlighting that science is not always confined to strict naturalism. Studies on prayer and near-death experiences, for instance, explore non-natural influences. These examples underscore the fact that the a priori rejection of non-natural causes is a philosophical position that requires justification, especially given the prevalence of dual-causal investigations in other fields.


    From a creationist perspective, excluding supernatural processes as potential causal explanations is not only unscientific but also detrimental to the pursuit of true knowledge. The goal of science should be to determine the causes and mechanisms underlying observed phenomena, regardless of whether they are natural or involve intelligent agency. The term “supernatural” refers to causes that are not due to physical laws and chemistry, such as programming or other information input. Excluding these potential causes compromises the integrity of scientific inquiry.


    A true scientist must follow all leads and consider all possibilities to ensure that the most accurate and comprehensive model is upheld. Science is grounded in the principles of evidence-based reasoning, and the evidence may lead to non-natural or supernatural causes. If naturalism is to be a consistent and reliable methodology, it must be applied across all scientific disciplines, including forensics and historical sciences.


    In conclusion, the pursuit of knowledge should not be constrained by arbitrary philosophical limitations. By embracing a broader definition of science that includes the possibility of non-natural causes, we can move closer to a more complete and accurate understanding of the universe. This approach aligns with the creationist worldview, which recognizes the intelligent design and purpose inherent in the natural world.